The key takeaway from this blog post is that :

Fraudsters are misusing the Income Tax Department’s automated data-collection system (AIS/Insight) by “feeding” fake, high-value transactions into innocent taxpayers’ profiles. Understanding Data Feeding Fraud is crucial in recognising how these manipulations occur. Consequently, the department fails to provide a “human” solution to this “digital” crime.

The 50 Core/500 million Lessons: (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

1. Systemic Vulnerability: The “Insight” portal automatically trusts data from third-party reporters, including fake rent or GST turnover. Consequently, the portal prioritizes this data over the taxpayer’s own “denials” on the portal. As a result, this creates a “Data Feeding” trap where it treats fraudulent income as truth.
2. Administrative Negligence: The Department dismisses grievances on “jurisdictional grounds”; consequently, this action shifts the burden to local offices. By doing this, the Department not only violates CPGRAMS guidelines, but also undermines the grievance process. Moreover, these guidelines mandate that the correct authority must receive the grievances, rather than simply dismissing them.
3. The Technological Gap: Currently, a local Ward Officer (ITO) lacks the technical tools to fix a centralized server error. Consequently, high-value identity theft cases (like this ₹500 Million fraud) need urgent intervention from the DGIT (Systems) and the Investigation Wing. Therefore, they do not require a local desk.
4. Legal Shield vs. Automated Sword: A Police FIR, like FIR 0291/2023, serves as a powerful legal shield. However, the Department’s “automated sword” currently ignores it. This system continues to issue tax demands based on “poisoned” data.

The bottom line: Taxpayers find themselves caught in a loop. The system moves too fast to identify fraud, while officials respond too slowly to stop the automated notices.

This blog post aims to highlight how the Income Tax Department’s automated systems fail when they encounter sophisticated identity theft. It focuses on your specific case to serve as a cautionary tale and a call to action for administrative reform.

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The Digital Nightmare: How “Data Feeding” Fraud is Weaponizing the Income Tax Portal

In the era of “Digital India,” the Annual Information Statement (AIS) aimed to protect taxpayers by providing transparency; however, for citizens like Yogi M. P. Singh (Mahesh Pratap Singh), it has unfortunately become a weapon. Furthermore, criminal syndicates exploit it to carry out a 500 Million Rupee identity theft scam.

The core issue isn’t just the fraud itself. The problem is also the “jurisdictional run-around.” Additionally, the automated systems fail to stop the fraudulent feeding of data. This happens even when a police FIR is active.

1. The Mechanics of “Data Feeding” Fraud

The current crisis revolves around a process we call “Fraudulent Data Feeding.” In a robust digital ecosystem, the Income Tax Department’s “Insight” portal, therefore, automatically pulls data. It does this, specifically, from third-party reporting entities—banks, employers, and corporations.

In this case, criminals have hijacked PAN GSWPS0850Q. Subsequently, they linked it to a fraudulent mobile number (7024188072) and connected it to a fake email address. Once they gained control of the digital identity, they began “feeding” the system with:

• Fictitious Rent: Over ₹6.6 million claimed as “Rent Paid” by 26 unauthorized sources.
• GST Turnover Fraud: Authorities reported a staggering ₹21 Crore turnover under a single PAN. This occurred despite the victim owning no such business.
• Contractual Siphoning: Nearly ₹6 Crore in business receipts under Section 194C.

The system automates processes and “trusts” the data fed into it more than the human victim trying to deny it.

2. The Failure of the “Information Denied” Shield (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

The Income Tax Department provides a “Feedback” mechanism on the Compliance Portal. Specifically, between December 15 and December 28, 2025, Yogi M. P. Singh used this tool to mark 24 separate entries as “Information is denied.”.

Logic dictates that such a high volume of denials for “High-Value Transactions” should trigger a manual security freeze. However, instead, the “speeding” system ignored the denials. Moreover, it generated automated reminders. As a result, this forced the victim to file returns for income he never earned. Therefore, this highlights a dangerous gap: The department has built an automated pipeline for receiving data. However, it lacks an automated “kill-switch” for victims of identity theft. Understanding Data Feeding Fraud is crucial in addressing these vulnerabilities and enhancing the protection mechanisms for those affected.

3. The “Jurisdictional Loop”: A Bureaucratic Escape

The victim filed formal grievances (CBODT/E/2025/0058077 and 0058082). The response from the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (CCIT) Allahabad was a classic example of administrative evasion. The offices in New Delhi, Lucknow, and Prayagraj had previously sent notices. They suddenly claimed a “lack of jurisdiction.” This shifted the burden to a local Ward Officer in Mirzapur.

This is the “Jurisdictional Loop.” A local ITO in a small ward does not have the technical authorization to:

1. Purge data from the Centralized “Insight” database.
2. Audit multinational corporations (MNCs) reporting fake rent.
3. Flag a PAN as “Vulnerable” at the national server level.

The department is closing these grievances instead of forwarding them to the DGIT (Systems) or the Investigation Wing. This action violates CPGRAMS guidelines and the department’s own Taxpayer Charter, highlighting a significant concern regarding potential oversights in handling complaints. Understanding Data Feeding Fraud is crucial in addressing these issues effectively.

4. Why This is a “Tax Evasion Petition” (TEP) Matter (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

This is not a routine tax dispute; it is a Tax Evasion Petition (TEP) involving money laundering. When ₹21 Crore in GST turnover is falsely attributed to a citizen, it indicates a serious issue. It means someone else is pocketing that money tax-free.

The department’s refusal to investigate the “Beneficiary Bank Accounts” where this ₹500 Million actually landed is a gross oversight. By focusing on the victim (the PAN holder) rather than the source of the “fed” data, the department is inadvertently protecting the fraudsters.

5. The Legal Stand: FIR 0291/2023 (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

The existence of Mirzapur Police FIR No. 0291/2023 (U/S 420 IPC, 66C and 66D IT Act) proves that the state’s law enforcement has recognized the crime. When a citizen provides a Police FIR, the Income Tax Department’s automated processing should, by law, be stayed. Continuing to issue notices based on “poisoned data” constitutes administrative harassment.

6. The Path Forward: Systemic Redressal

To solve this core issue, the CBDT must move beyond jurisdictional excuses. The following steps are mandatory for justice:

• Centralized Flagging: The DGIT (Systems) must create a “Vulnerable” status for PANs involved in documented identity theft.
• Mandatory Forwarding: Therefore, adherence to CPGRAMS rules—grievances regarding systemic fraud must be transferred to the Investigation Wing; otherwise, they should not be closed.
• Data Purging: A protocol must be established to “un-feed” or purge SFT data once a Police FIR confirms the reporting entities are fraudulent.

Conclusion (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

The case of Yogi M. P. Singh is a wake-up call. If the Income Tax Department continues to “run away” from its responsibility, citing jurisdictional boundaries, our trust in the digital tax infrastructure will crumble. This inaction will erode confidence. We are not just fighting a 500 Million Rupee fraud. We are fighting for an administrative system. This system values the rights of a citizen over the convenience of an automated algorithm.

To ensure your appeal is acted upon, you must move beyond the automated portal. Contact the specific “Public Authorities” who have the power to override the system.

Below are the structured details of the officials and platforms. You should send your Appeal Numbers (CBODT/E/A/26/0000245 & 246). Also, send the Mirzapur Police FIR.

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1. Primary Public Authorities (Decision Makers)

Authority	Name/Designation	Email Address	Role in Your Case
CCIT Allahabad	Ms. Mona Mohanty	allahabad.ccit@incometax.gov.in	The office that closed your case; they must now process the appeal.
DGIT (Systems)	Director General (Systems)	dgitsystems@incometax.gov.in	The only office that can “Lock” your PAN or purge the “Fed” data.
DGIT (Investigation)	DGIT (Inv) Lucknow	lucknow.dgit.inv@incometax.gov.in	Handles Tax Evasion Petitions (TEP) and high-value money laundering.
CBDT Chairman	Chairman, CBDT	chairmancbdt@nic.in	Highest authority for systemic failures and administrative policy.

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2. Digital Portals (Web Links)(Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

• CPGRAMS (Grievance/Appeal Tracking):https://pgportal.gov.in/
  • Use this to check the status of your Appeals: CBODT/E/A/26/0000245 and 246.
• Income Tax E-Filing Portal:https://www.incometax.gov.in/
  • Navigate to “Pending Actions” > “Compliance Portal” to keep denying the fraudulent rent entries.
• Insight Portal (Internal): This is not accessible to the public, but you should mention it in emails as the place where your PAN needs to be flagged as “Vulnerable.”

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3. Contact Numbers for Follow-up

• Income Tax Office, Allahabad (CCIT): 0532-2408005
• Aayakar Seva Kendra (ASK) Helpline: 1800-180-1961 / 1961
• E-filing/Centralized Processing Center (CPC): 1800-103-0025

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4. Application/Grievance ID Summary (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

Keep these ready for every phone call or email subject line:

• Appeal 1 (General): CBODT/E/A/26/0000245
• Appeal 2 (TEP/Investigation): CBODT/E/A/26/0000246
• Police Case: FIR No. 0291/2023 (Kotwali Katra, Mirzapur)
• PAN: GSWPS0850Q

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5. Strategy for the Email (Understanding Data Feeding Fraud)

When emailing these authorities, use a Single Thread. Send the email to the CCIT Allahabad and CC (Carbon Copy) the DGIT (Systems) and the CBDT Chairman. This prevents them from “running away” because they can see that their superiors are also informed of the jurisdictional loop.

Would you like me to draft a high-priority “Combined Email Template”? It will include all your appeal IDs and your specific demand to stop the data feeding.