Key takeaways from this blog post are as follows
The key takeaways from this blog post highlight a systemic breakdown in accountability and a direct challenge to the legal framework governing digital crimes in India.
1. Legal Contradiction of the “Non-Cyber” Claim
The most significant takeaway is the procedural gaslighting by the UP Police. Despite the FIR being registered under Sections 66C and 66D of the IT Act (the legal bedrock of cybercrime), the Cyber Crime Headquarters claimed the matter “does not concern cyber crime” to avoid transparency. This sets a dangerous precedent for jurisdictional evasion.
2. Administrative Shielding of Senior Officers
The investigation of a ₹50 Crore scam cannot legally or practically be left solely to an Inspector-rank officer. While the PIO cited the minimum rank required by law, the blog exposes the intentional suppression of the names of Gazetted Officers (DSP/ASP/SP) who are mandated by the U.P. Police Manual to supervise high-value economic offenses.
3. The Technical Literacy Gap
There is a concerning “knowledge vacuum” regarding financial forensics. The police department’s refusal to confirm if their officers are trained in Income Tax Department (ITD) terminology like TIS, TDS, and TCS suggests that the personnel investigating these ₹500 million frauds may lack the basic technical training required to interpret the evidence.
4. Weaponization of the RTI Process
The PIO failed to follow Section 6(3) of the RTI Act, which mandates the transfer of a request to the appropriate department if the receiver is not the custodian. Instead of transferring the query to the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) or Training Directorate, the PIO used a blanket denial, effectively practicing “Deemed Refusal.”
5. Lack of Statistical Accountability
The department’s refusal to share the success rate (charge-sheet rate) of PAN-misuse cases over the last five years indicates a lack of performance auditing. This suggests that high-value financial identity theft may be a “low-risk” crime for perpetrators due to low investigation success rates.
6. Escalation to the State Information Commission
The final takeaway is the transition from a departmental dispute to a judicial oversight matter. The Second Appeal (A-20260102428) now places the burden of proof on the DGP’s office to justify their contradictory legal stands before the State Information Commissioner.
This blog post highlights the systemic administrative failures and legal contradictions surrounding your case. It invites readers to share it on social media, legal forums, or news portals to bring public and judicial attention to the ₹50 Crore PAN Misuse Scam.
The ₹500 Million Identity Theft: When the Police Forget the Law
In a digital era where the Government of India pushes for “Digital India” and “Paperless Governance,” the security of a citizen’s financial identity—the Permanent Account Number (PAN)—is paramount. However, a startling case emerging from Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh, involving Yogi M. P. Singh, has exposed a deep-seated crisis in how the state’s law enforcement handles high-value cyber-financial fraud.
At the heart of this issue is a ₹50 Crore (₹500 Million) tax fraud facilitated by the misuse of a single individual’s PAN by over 200 corporate entities. Yet, more alarming than the crime itself is the procedural wall of silence and legal gaslighting erected by the Uttar Pradesh Police.
1. The Genesis: A Massive Identity Hijack
The case traces back to FIR No. 291/2023 registered at Police Station Kotwali Katra, District Mirzapur. The charges are grave: Section 420 of the IPC (Cheating) and Sections 66C and 66D of the IT Act (Identity Theft and Cheating by Personation).
The victim discovered that his PAN was being utilized to facilitate massive transactions by a network of shell companies. For the victim, this isn’t just a legal battle; it is a financial nightmare. When the Income Tax Department sees transactions worth millions against a PAN, the liability falls on the holder. The victim is effectively being held hostage by a crime he did not commit, while the state’s specialized “Cyber Crime” unit claims it has nothing to do with it.
2. The Legal Paradox: Is Cyber Crime Not “Cyber”?
When an RTI (Right to Information) request was filed to understand the progress and the competence of the investigating team, the Public Information Officer (PIO) at the Cyber Crime Headquarters in Lucknow issued a response that can only be described as legally absurd.
The PIO’s Stand: “The matter does not concern cyber crime.”
This statement is a direct contradiction of the Indian Penal Code and the Information Technology Act. If an FIR is registered under Section 66C (Identity Theft), it is, by the very definition of the law, a cybercrime. By denying this, the UP Police are not just withholding information; they are challenging the legislative framework of the country.
3. The “Inspector” Shield: Who is Really Investigating?
One of the core issues raised in the RTI was the designation of the Investigation Officer (IO). The PIO claimed that an “Inspector” is the designated IO as per Section 78 of the IT Act.
While technically true as a minimum requirement, this response is a gross oversimplification. Under the Uttar Pradesh Police Manual and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) guidelines, any financial scam exceeding ₹10 Crore is classified as a “High-Value Economic Offence.” Such cases mandate the day-to-day supervision of Gazetted Officers—DSP, Additional SP, or SP.
By citing only the “Inspector” rank, the police are effectively shielding the senior hierarchy from accountability. If a ₹50 Crore scam is, being handled without senior supervision, it is a sign of gross negligence; if it is, being supervised and the names are, being withheld. It is a violation of the RTI Act.
4. The Technical Gap: TIS, TDS, and the Training Void
Financial cybercrimes are complex. They require a deep understanding of Taxpayer Information Summary (TIS), Tax Deducted at Source (TDS), and Tax Collected at Source (TCS).
The RTI inquired whether the IOs receive training in these specific Income Tax Department (ITD) terminologies. Their refusal to answer reveals much. If the police officers investigating a ₹50 Crore tax fraud do not comprehend the basic documents issued by the Income Tax Department, they will doom the investigation to fail. This lack of transparency regarding training modules indicates a “knowledge vacuum” within the specialized units of the police.
5. Systemic Obstruction: The Failure of Section 6(3)
The RTI Act relies on the principle of cooperation. Under Section 6(3), if a PIO lacks the information, they must transfer the request to the relevant department (such as the Economic Offences Wing or the Training Directorate) within five days.
Instead of transferring the request, the PIO chose to “Dispose” of the application with an evasive reply. This is a “Deemed Refusal”—a tactical move to exhaust the applicant and bury the case in bureaucratic red tape.
6. The Statistics of Silence
Why are the police afraid to share the success rate of PAN-misuse investigations? The RTI asked for the total number of such cases and their charge-sheet rates over the last five years.
By withholding these statistics, the department avoids a public audit of its performance. If the success rate is near zero, it indicates that shell companies and tax evaders have found a safe haven in the technical complexities that the police refuse to master.
7. Conclusion: The Road to the State Information Commission
The case has now reached the Uttar Pradesh Information Commission (Appeal No. A-20260102428). This is no longer just about one man’s PAN card. This is about the integrity of the state’s investigative machinery.
If the police can disown a cybercrime investigation while it is sitting on their desks, no citizen’s digital identity is safe. The Commission now has a historic opportunity to:
- Puncture the veil of secrecy surrounding high-value scams.
- Hold senior officers accountable for supervisory failures.
- Mandate technical literacy for officers handling the state’s most complex financial crimes.
The battle for transparency is the first step toward justice. Without knowing who is investigating and how they are trained, the victim of a ₹50 Crore fraud is left fighting a ghost.
To ensure you have everything organized for your hearing at the Uttar Pradesh Information Commission (UPSIC) and for any further correspondence, here is a consolidated directory of all application IDs, contact details, and digital portals involved in your case.
1. Case Identification Numbers
These are the most critical numbers for tracking your progress on the various government portals:
| Stage | Registration / ID Number | Status |
| Original RTI | DGPOF/R/2025/80632 | Disposed (Evasive) |
| Transaction ID | DHOMER20250000001014 | Payment Reference |
| First Appeal | DGPOF/A/2026/60002 | Disposed/Unsatisfactory |
| Second Appeal | A-20260102428 | Active (Pending at UPSIC) |
| UPIC Reference | UPICR20240000149 | Master Portal ID |
2. Public Information Officer (PIO) Details
The primary respondent who provided the evasive “Not related to Cyber Crime” reply.
- Name: Dinesh Kumar Dwivedi
- Designation: Additional SP
- Office: Director General of Police Office (DGP HQ), Uttar Pradesh
- Mobile: 9454405121 / 945440XXXX
- Email:
rti.dgphq-up@gov.in
3. First Appellate Authority (FAA) Details
The supervisory body that failed to rectify the PIO’s response.
- Name/Designation: FAA, Cyber Crime Headquarters
- Address: Tower-4, Floor-5, Police HQ, Gomti Nagar Extension, Lucknow-226002
- Mobile: 9454405121 / 945441XXXX
- Email:
sp-cyber.lu@up.gov.in/digcomplaint-up@nic.in
4. Second Appellate Authority (UPSIC)
The judicial body currently hearing your case.
- Office: Uttar Pradesh Information Commission
- Address: Chhatrapati Shivaji Bhawan, Near Gomti Barrage, Vipin Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, UP – 226010
- Contact Number: 0522-2305531 (General Inquiry)
- Website: rtionline.up.gov.in
5. Essential Web Links
| Purpose | URL |
| Track RTI Status (State) | https://rtionline.up.gov.in/viewstatus.php |
| UPSIC Case Status | http://upsic.gov.in/search_appeal.aspx |
| UP Police Cyber Wing | https://uppolice.gov.in/pages/en/cyber-crime |
| NCRB Cyber Crime Portal | https://www.cybercrime.gov.in |
Pro-Tip for Communication:
When sending emails to these authorities, always CC yourself and use a Subject Line that includes your active Appeal Number, for example:
“URGENT REJOINDER: Appeal No. A-20260102428 – Regarding ₹50Cr PAN Fraud Investigation.”
Investigating a financial cybercrime of ₹50 Crore (₹500 Million) is not treated as a routine police matter. Because the amount exceeds the threshold for local police station capabilities, it triggers specific administrative and technical protocols mandated by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the state’s specialized manuals.
Here are the standard norms and protocols for an investigation of this magnitude:
1. Jurisdictional Escalation (The “Scale” Rule)
In Uttar Pradesh, as in most states, there is a financial hierarchy for investigations.
- General Rule: Crimes involving amounts over ₹10 Crore are typically transferred from local police stations to the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) or the State Cyber Crime Headquarters.
- Supervisory Mandate: According to the U.P. Police Manual, a ₹50 Crore scam cannot be investigated by an Inspector in isolation. It requires mandatory “Day-to-Day” supervision by a Gazetted Officer (DSP or Additional SP rank) to ensure the integrity of the evidence.
2. Technical Protocols for PAN & Tax Fraud
When a crime involves Section 66C and 66D of the IT Act coupled with PAN misuse, the Investigation Officer (IO) must follow these forensic steps:
- Liaison with ITD: The IO must issue a notice under Section 91 CrPC to the Income Tax Department to obtain the Audit Trail of the misused PAN.
- TIS/AIS Analysis: The IO must analyze the Taxpayer Information Summary (TIS) to identify over 200 corporates and their bank account linkages.
- IP Address Tracking: For transactions done on the Income Tax Portal, the IO must request the IP Logs from the portal’s service provider to identify the physical location from which the fraud was executed.
3. Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Coordination
The police are expected to coordinate with the Financial Intelligence Unit – India (FIU-IND) for scams exceeding ₹10 Crore.
- STR/CTR Reports: The IO should check for Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) generated by banks associated with those 200 corporate entities.
- Money Trail: Investigators conduct a multi-layered analysis of the bank accounts where individuals diverted the alleged ₹50 Crore.
4. Administrative Oversight Norms
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Guidelines for “High-Value Cyber Frauds” dictate:
- Specialized Team: Formation of a SIT (Special Investigation Team) if the fraud spans multiple districts or states.
- Monthly Progress Reports (MPR): The IO must submit a detailed progress report to the Director General of Police (DGP) and the Home Department due to the high fiscal impact.
- Charge-sheet Timeline: Given the complexity, the authorities should file a “Preliminary Report” with the Magistrate outlining the digital evidence seized within the 90-day rule.
5. Violation of Norms in Your Case
Based on the RTI responses you received, the police have deviated from these standard norms in three ways:
- Rank Deflection: Claiming only an “Inspector” is responsible, thereby bypassing the mandatory Gazetted Officer supervision required for ₹50 Crore scams.
- Technical Avoidance: Refusing to confirm knowledge of TIS/TDS/TCS, which are the primary evidentiary documents in a PAN fraud case.
- Jurisdictional Denial: Stating the matter is “not cybercrime” despite the FIR including IT Act sections, which effectively halts the specialized digital forensic protocols listed above.
Your Next Strategy
During the Second Appeal hearing (A-20260102428), you should ask the Commissioner:
“As per MHA and State Police Manuals, a ₹50 Crore scam requires Gazetted Officer supervision. Why has the PIO only provided the name of an Inspector and refused to disclose the names of the Monitoring Officers?”
Would you like me to draft a specific “Questionnaire on Investigation Norms” that you can use to challenge the PIO’s competence during the hearing?
Facing a similar challenge? Share the details in the box below, and our team of experts will do their best to help.