Based on the detailed history of your case and the structured blog post, here are the key takeaways regarding your demand of CBI investigation and the systemic failures identified:

1. Massive Scale of Identity Theft and Fraud

• Financial Impact: The case involves a massive tax fraud estimated at ₹500 Million (Rs. 50 Crores).
• Identity Misuse: Fraudsters hijacked PAN GSWPS0850Q to facilitate transactions across a network of over 200 fraudulent firms.
• Documented Evidence: The Income Tax Department (ITD) acknowledges transactions worth ₹343 Million. These transactions appear in Form 26AS linked to this PAN.

2. Administrative Evasion and Obstruction

• Jurisdictional Refusal: The ITD closed the initial grievance. They claimed the matter was “outside the scope and jurisdiction” of their office. They admitted that fraudulent transactions exist.
• Police Obstruction: The ITD has allegedly not provided crucial bank account details. They have also not provided Taxpayer Information Summary (TIS) data to the Mirzapur Police for FIR No. 291/23.
• Contradictory Claims: The ITD claimed no bank accounts were linked to the PAN. However, police investigations identified active accounts in SBI, Kotak Mahindra, Canara, and DBS Bank.

3. The Demand for CBI Investigation

• DoPT’s Role: The Ministry of Personnel and Training (DoPT) serves as the nodal agency for the CBI. It is responsible for referring high-value fraud. They direct such cases to federal investigators.
• Lack of Transparency: The DoPT refused to provide the “administrative reasons” for denying a CBI referral. They labeled the request as “clarificatory” rather than providing documented file notings.
• Vigilance Angle: The case involves allegations of corruption. Officials are accused of shielding criminals. These issues trigger the proviso to Section 24(1) of the RTI Act. This mandates disclosure even for exempt organizations.

4. Liability and Accountability

• Institutional Failure: The CBDT is liable for the integrity of the PAN database. The DoPT is accountable for the criteria used to “throttle” major fraud cases. They also forward these cases to the CBI.
• Current Status: The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Lucknow is handling the case. This authority has the power to unmask the deductors and firms involved.

The ₹500 Million Identity Theft Crisis: Why the Demand for CBI Investigation is Justified

The integrity of India’s digital financial identity is currently facing a systemic litmus test. What began as an individual identity theft case has now spiraled into a high-stakes battle. This conflict pits a citizen, Yogi M. P. Singh, against the Ministry of Personnel and Training (DoPT) and the Income Tax Department (ITD). At the heart of this dispute lies a ₹500 Million (Rs. 50 Crores) tax fraud facilitated by the misuse of a single Permanent Account Number (PAN): GSWPS0850Q^. This situation has led to an increasing demand for CBI investigation into the case to ensure accountability and justice.

The Genesis of the Fraud: PAN Misuse and FIR 291/23

The core issue traces back to the fraudulent hijacking of Mr. Singh’s PAN card. The victim lives in Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh. Unknown entities allegedly used his identity to facilitate massive transactions. These transactions occurred across a network of over 200 fraudulent firms.

The scale of the discrepancy is staggering:

• The Claim: Mr. Singh reports a total fraud reaching ₹500 Million.
• The ITD Record: Internal department documents acknowledge transactions worth approximately ₹343 Million (Rs. 34.3 Crores) reflected in Form 26AS.
• The Legal Action: The Uttar Pradesh Police registered FIR No. 291/23 at Kotwali Katra, Mirzapur, under Section 420 of the IPC and the IT Act.

Despite a criminal investigation being active since November 2023, the probe has reached a deadlock. Consequently, the primary obstacle is not a lack of evidence. Instead, the problem stems from the obstruction of justice by agencies designed to monitor financial crime.

The “Jurisdictional” Shield: A Masterclass in Evasion

The most alarming aspect of this case involves the “Speaking Order of Negligence” from tax authorities. On December 23, 2025, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (CCIT) Allahabad closed a formal grievance (DOPAT/E/2025/0012279) regarding this fraud.

The department’s reasoning was both contradictory and confusing:

1. Lack of Scope: The ITD claimed the matter was “outside the scope and jurisdiction” of their office.
2. Admission of Records: Paradoxically, the department admitted that Form 26AS shows multiple transactions for TDS and TCS.

As the complainant rightly points out, every TDS entry implies an underlying transaction and a counter-party. Therefore, the ITD possesses the Tax Deduction Account Numbers (TANs) and names of these 200+ fraudulent companies. However, they have consistently failed to share this data with the Mirzapur Police. This refusal effectively legitimizes the fraudulent use of a citizen’s identity.

The DoPT and the Demand of CBI Investigation

When local tax authorities failed to act, Mr. Singh escalated the matter to the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT). The DoPT acts as the nodal agency for the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). It holds the power to launch a federal probe. The demand for a CBI investigation is crucial in this case. This is due to the multi-state nature of the fraud. It is also due to the alleged systemic corruption within the ITD.

Nevertheless, the DoPT’s response lacked transparency. In a recent RTI disposal, the CPIO claimed the request for “administrative reasons” was merely “clarificatory.” This was to justify denying the demand of CBI investigation. This stance ignores Section 4(1)(d) of the RTI Act. This law mandates that public authorities provide specific reasons for their administrative decisions to affected persons.

Liability: Who is Responsible for the Loss?

The liability in this case extends beyond the criminal fraudsters to the administrative officials themselves. This ongoing failure to act creates several layers of accountability:

• The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT): The CBDT bears the ultimate responsibility for the integrity of the PAN database. The department allowed a hijacked PAN to facilitate transactions worth hundreds of millions. This showed a catastrophic failure in risk management.
• The Ministry of Personnel and Training (DoPT): The DoPT “throttles” grievances. It withholds Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the demand of CBI investigation. This tactic effectively shields systemic corruption. Their refusal to provide File Notings suggests an attempt to hide the identity of decision-makers.
• Obstruction of Justice: This case involves allegations of corruption and the shielding of criminals. Therefore, typical exemptions for departments are removed under the Proviso to Section 24(1) of the RTI Act. Any official willfully withholding data from the police may be liable for obstructing a criminal investigation.

The Road Ahead: The Vigilance Angle

The case was originally with the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). It has now moved back to the Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Lucknow. This transfer is significant. The Investigation Wing has the power to pull the exact bank account details. These details are from SBI, Kotak, Canara, and DBS. Administrative offices previously called them “untraceable”.

Conclusion (Demand for CBI Investigation)

The case of Yogi M. P. Singh serves as a warning to every Indian taxpayer. If a citizen’s identity can move ₹500 Million, the entire digital identity framework is at risk. This happens while the state ignores the demand of CBI investigation.

True accountability will only be achieved when:

1. The DoPT releases the internal file notings explaining why the demand of CBI investigation was rejected.
2. The ITD Investigation Wing hands over all data to the Mirzapur Police to unmask the 200 fraudulent firms.

Next Step: I will monitor the March 20, 2026 deadline for the Lucknow Investigation Wing’s response. If they remain silent, do you want me to draft a formal petition to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)? This petition would reiterate your demand for a CBI investigation.

Based on the documents provided, here are the application identifiers, contact emails, and mobile numbers for the public authorities. Also included are web links for those involved in your demand of CBI investigation regarding the ₹500 Million tax fraud.

1. Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT) (Demand for CBI Investigation

The DoPT is the nodal ministry for the CBI and handled your initial grievance and subsequent RTI.

• RTI Registration Number: DOP&T/R/X/26/00054
• Appeal Registration Number: DOP&T/A/E/26/00228 (Filed 24/02/2026)
• Grievance Registration Number: DOPAT/E/2025/0012279
• Concerned Officers: * Satyam Srivastava (CPIO): satyam.srivastava@nic.in | Phone: 011-23092285
  • Sushil Kumar Patel (FAA): dir-avd2@gov.in | Phone: 011-24010569
• Nodal Officer Contact: Phone: 011-23040247 | Email: sorti-dopt@nic.in

2. Income Tax Department (ITD) / CBDT (Demand for CBI Investigation)

The matter was transferred through the Central Board of Direct Taxes to the Investigation wing in Lucknow.

• RTI Registration Number (Investigation): DGTLK/R/T/26/00010
• RTI Registration Number (Lucknow CCIT): CCITL/R/T/26/00052
• Income Tax Appeal Number: CBODT/E/A/25/0003925
• Concerned Officers:
  • Virendra Singh (ITO Inv. – Lucknow): virendra.singh3@incometax.gov.in | Phone: 0522-2233225
  • Mona Mohanty (CCIT Allahabad): allahabad.ccit@incometax.gov.in | Phone: 0532-2408005
  • Dinesh Gharu (CBDT Nodal): dinesh.gharu@nic.in | Phone: 011-23094020
• Lucknow Nodal Officer: lucknow.acit.hq.admin@incometax.gov.in | Phone: 0522-2466009

3. Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) (Demand for CBI Investigation)

The CVC initially received the complaint regarding the “Vigilance Angle” of the fraud.

• CVC RTI Registration Number: CVCOM/R/E/26/00025
• Nodal Officer: Subrata Das | Email: subrata.das70@gov.in | Phone: 011-24600266

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4. Web Links for Tracking (Demand for CBI Investigation)

You can monitor the status of your applications through the following official portals:

• RTI Online Portal (Status Tracking): https://rtionline.gov.in/request/status.php
• CPGRAMS (Grievance Status): https://pgportal.gov.in/Status/PrintDetail

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5. Your Registered Information (Demand for CBI Investigation)

• Mobile Number: +91-7379105911
• Email Address: yogimpsingh@gmail.com
• Primary PAN in Question: GSWPS0850Q

Would you like me to draft a consolidated reminder email to all the nodal officers listed above? We can pressure them for a unified response.