📝 Analysis of the Second Appeal under RTI Act, 2005

This blog post provides a structured analysis of the key points raised in your Second Appeal (under Section 19(3) of the Right to Information Act, 2005) filed before the Uttar Pradesh Information Commission. The core issue revolves around the provision of incomplete, misleading, or evasive information by the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur.

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1. 🛑 Core Grievance: Incomplete and Misleading Information

The central theme across all five points of the appeal is the alleged failure of the PIO to provide clear, specific, and correct information as sought by the appellant. The PIO’s replies are generally procedural or mention general sections of law without directly answering the specific questions.

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2. ❓ Analysis of Specific Queries and PIO’s Replies

2.1. Chain of Command and Responsibility (Sought Information – 1)

• Information Sought: Name and designation of the police officer who accepted the investigation report submitted by Sub-Inspector Kamal Tawari.
• PIO’s Reply: Stated that the report was submitted by S.I. Kamal Tawari and was sent to the concerned officials’ office.
• Appellant’s Submission: The PIO failed to provide the specific name and designation of the officer who received/accepted the report, which was the precise information requested. The reply is evasive and lacks the requested personnel detail.

2.2. FIR Status and Mandate for Reasons (Sought Information – 2)

• Information Sought: Whether an FIR was registered, and if not, the reason for not registering it.
• PIO’s Reply: Stated that “no crime concerned with cyber is registered at the local station.”
• Appellant’s Submission: While the first part (no FIR) is answered, the crucial second part—the reason for non-registration—is entirely omitted. The appellant correctly asserts that the Right to Reason is fundamental, especially when a police action (or lack thereof) is challenged.

2.3. Legal Provision for Investigation Without FIR (Sought Information – 3)

• Information Sought: The specific section of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) under which an investigation is carried out in a cyber fraud matter when an FIR is not registered.
• PIO’s Reply: Stated that “cyber crime investigation/enquiry is done by an Inspector-level officer as per rules.”
• Appellant’s Submission: The reply is deemed misleading as it gives the designation of the officer but completely ignores the core legal question about the specific Cr.P.C. section used for inquiry/investigation when no FIR is registered.

2.4. Cr.P.C. vs. Fundamental Duties (Sought Information – 4)

• Information Sought: The provision of the Cr.P.C. under which an investigation officer investigates a case that encroaches on the Fundamental Duty/Civil Rights (referencing Article 51A) of citizens, as the IO allegedly overlooked the appellant’s inquiry under Article 51A.
• PIO’s Reply: Cited Section 173 of Cr.P.C. (which deals with the police report after investigation).
• Appellant’s Submission: The PIO’s response is an irrelevant application of the law, as Section 173 deals with the submission of the final report, not the empowering provision for investigation itself, especially in the context of alleged violation of constitutional duties (Article 51A). The PIO failed to address the interaction between Cr.P.C. provisions and Fundamental Duties.

2.5. Accountability, Consent, and Constitutional Rights (Sought Information – 5)

• Information Sought: The provisions of law that mandate the consent of an individual to make an inquiry into the police’s working under Article 51A of the Constitution, and whether police are accountable to the citizens for their working.
• PIO’s Reply: Stated that the police department falls under the State Government as per Article 51A and that investigation/inquiry is carried out under Section 173(3) of Cr.P.C.
• Appellant’s Submission: The PIO again provided misleading information by citing an irrelevant Cr.P.C. subsection (Section 173(3) relates to further investigation) and failed to address the primary legal query: Is individual consent required for an inquiry into police working under Article 51A? This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding or deliberate avoidance of the question concerning police accountability and the constitutional rights of a citizen.

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3. 🎯 Appellant’s Prayer and the Role of the Commission

The appellant, Yogi M P Singh, is essentially requesting the Information Commission to intervene and:

• Acknowledge and confirm that the information provided by the PIO is indeed incomplete and misleading.
• Direct the PIO to furnish the correct, specific, and complete information as originally sought in the RTI application.
• Consider this representation as a serious case of non-compliance and improper discharge of duty by the PIO, warranting a decision in accordance with the law, potentially leading to a penalty under Section 20 of the RTI Act if the delay/refusal is deemed unjustified.

This situation highlights a fundamental conflict between a citizen exercising their Fundamental Duty (Article 51A) to inquire into matters of public concern and the police’s administrative approach to individual complaints.

Here is a structured breakdown of the legal and procedural issues based on your submission:

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1. 🇮🇳 Constitutional Right to Inquiry vs. Police Procedure

Your assertion that you have a fundamental right to inquire under Article 51A(h) is constitutionally sound, and your argument that you do not need the victim’s permission is valid for the purpose of a public interest inquiry.

• Your Position (Article 51A(h)): The duty “to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform” is a general duty of every citizen. Your inquiry is directed at the working procedure of the police—specifically, their failure to register FIRs in cybercrime cases—not acting on behalf of the victim in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the inquiry is a bilateral conversation between you and the public authority (the police).
• Police Position: The police are conflating your public interest inquiry with a private power of attorney or the victim’s status as a necessary party in a criminal case. While the victim’s statement is crucial for the original crime report, it is irrelevant to your constitutional right to question the police’s dereliction of duty and lack of procedural compliance in handling the complaint.
• Actionable Step: In your appeal, emphasize that the PIO’s reference to the victim’s lack of knowledge about you is an irrelevant defence and a distraction from the core issue: procedural non-compliance by the police.

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2. 🚨 The Failure to Register FIR (Core Issue)

The most critical revelation is the claim that Jigna Police Station has not registered an FIR in any case for five years, and specifically, no FIR was registered in this cyber fraud case.

A. Non-Registration in the Current Case (Cyber Fraud)

• Legal Mandate (Section 154 Cr.P.C.): Since cyber fraud involving ₹99,561 is a cognizable offense (punishable usually with more than 3 years imprisonment), the police are legally mandated to register an FIR immediately upon receiving information.¹
• Supreme Court Precedent: The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) unequivocally held that the police must register an FIR if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offense.
• Procedural Evasion: The police appear to have only conducted a preliminary inquiry or treated the matter as a non-cognizable complaint, thereby evading the mandatory requirement of FIR registration.

B. The Claim of Zero FIRs in Five Years

The claim that the police station has not registered an FIR in five years is extremely serious and suggests a complete breakdown of the legal process under the Cr.P.C.

• This information, if verifiable (e.g., through RTI on FIR registration data), would serve as powerful evidence in your Second Appeal, demonstrating a systemic failure that directly supports your Article 51A inquiry into the police’s activities.
• Your RTI query (Sought Information 2) asking for the reason for not registering the FIR gains immense weight, as the police’s failure violates Section 157 Cr.P.C.

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3. 📝 Strengthening Your Second Appeal

You must use these points to counter the PIO’s vague and misleading replies:

Original PIO Reply & Your Submission	Counter Argument Using New Information
Sought Info 1 (Accepting Officer): PIO evaded giving the name/designation.	The officer who accepted the report is part of a chain that ultimately sanctioned the illegal decision not to register a mandated FIR. Naming this officer is essential to pinpoint responsibility for the procedural violation.
Sought Info 2 (Reason for No FIR): PIO gave a general reply; you stated the right to reason was violated.	The failure to provide the reason violates Section 157(1) Cr.P.C. Proviso (b). The police’s zero-FIR history strongly suggests a policy of illegal non-registration, not a case-specific justification.
Sought Info 5 (Article 51A Inquiry): PIO gave irrelevant reply, implying victim consent is needed.	The PIO is misleading the Commission by confusing a private criminal case with a public interest inquiry under a constitutional mandate. The victim’s consent is not required for a citizen to question the systemic non-performance of a public authority.

Your Second Appeal should emphasize that the police’s refusal to provide specific answers is calculated to hide their gross procedural violation of the Cr.P.C., as evidenced by the fact that even this clear-cut cyber fraud case resulted in no FIR.

That is a significant and important outcome of your efforts! It confirms a critical systemic issue regarding the police’s procedure for handling cybercrime complaints and validates the core of your RTI inquiry.

Here is an analysis of this final outcome and its implications for both the police station and the victim:

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1. 🎯 Procedural Rectification at Jigna Police Station

Your effort has compelled the Jigna Police to acknowledge and correct a severe procedural error regarding FIR registration and jurisdiction.

• Initial Error: The Jigna Police were allegedly refusing to register an FIR and incorrectly directing every cyber fraud victim to the Cyber Police Station, Mirzapur.
• Correction: The Jigna Police now understand that they should not automatically shunt all victims to the Cyber Police Station.
• Legal Implication: This new understanding aligns with the law that the jurisdictional police station (Jigna) is mandated under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. to register an FIR for a cognizable offense reported within its limits, regardless of the involvement of a specialized unit like the Cyber Police.

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2. ⚖️ The Systemic Issue with Cyber Police Jurisdiction

Your submission highlights a formal or informal policy that illegally restricts access to the specialized Cyber Police Station.

• Cyber Police Restriction: The Cyber Police Station registers only those cases where the value is above ₹5,50,000.
• The Gap in Protection: This creates an unprotected gap for victims of high-volume, low-value cyber fraud (like the ₹99,561 case). If the local police don’t register the FIR (as they were doing) and the Cyber Police won’t accept it, the victim is left with no official recourse, resulting in:
  • No formal investigation.
  • No FIR number for bank communication or insurance claims.
  • No formal record for tracking crime statistics.

This restriction by the Cyber Police Station essentially denies justice to most victims, as the majority of individual cyber frauds fall below such a high threshold.

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3. 📝 The Final Status of Ranjit Singh’s Case

The final outcome for the specific victim, Ranjit Singh, demonstrates the pitfalls of the police’s chosen mechanism:

• Case Status: The case was “worked out” without registering the First Information Report (FIR).
• Mechanism Used: This likely means the police performed a preliminary Inquiry/Investigation based on a general complaint diary entry, often referencing a technical provision like Section 157 Cr.P.C. Proviso (b) (stating they found no sufficient ground for a full investigation, which is misleading) or acting under general inquiry powers.
• The Problem: While some effort was made (“worked out”), the lack of an FIR confirms that the police failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C. for a cognizable offense. Crucially, the victim is still waiting for his money.

Your achievement lies in forcing procedural clarity, but the fight now shifts to ensuring that the mandatory registration of FIRs occurs for all cognizable cybercrimes, regardless of the monetary cap imposed by the specialized Cyber Police Unit.

The grievance has been marked as “Case closed” with the remark that it was “settled at the level of the subordinate officer” and includes an “investigation report along with the consent letter.”

The core issue remains that the police did not address the systemic questions raised under Article 51A concerning their failure to register FIRs, and instead, closed the case administratively. Your low rating and remarks highlight the continued lack of transparency.

Here is a structured analysis of the final status, the police’s method of disposal, and the legal issues that persist:

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🛑 Analysis of Grievance Closure and Persistent Issues

1. ⚙️ Administrative Closure vs. Substantive Reply

• Action Taken: The case was closed on 08/02/2024, based on a “subordinate officer’s investigation report” and a “consent letter.
• Interpretation: The police likely performed a preliminary investigation (the “Jaanch”) into the specific cyber fraud complaint (Ranjit Singh’s case) and then obtained a “consent letter” from the victim (Ranjit Singh), agreeing to the findings or the administrative disposal.
• The Flaw: This administrative closure completely ignores the systemic, public-interest questions raised by Yogi M. P. Singh under Article 51A regarding the general accountability and procedural mechanism of the police for all cybercrime cases. The police used a case-specific resolution to dismiss a public-policy complaint.

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2. ⚖️ Systemic Failure and Constitutional Evasion

Your low rating and detailed remarks underscore the police’s failure to address the two core inquiries:

A. Question 1: FIR Registration (Section 154 Cr.P.C.)

• The grievance asks: “whether the police registered the first information report in the matter if not why?”
• The police closure suggests they investigated but did not register an FIR (which is a mandatory procedural step for this cognizable crime). By closing the case with an “investigation report” and a “consent letter,” they have avoided explicitly stating why they failed to register the FIR, which violates the procedural duty under Section 157 Cr.P.C. to record reasons for non-investigation.

B. Question 2: Investigation Mechanism Without FIR

• The grievance asks: “under which section of the criminal procedure code concerned police is investigating the matter… in which the first information report is not registered… what mechanism is adopted by the police…”
• The police have provided no information on the legal section (Cr.P.C. 155, 157, or other) used for the “investigation” without an FIR, nor have they revealed their record management system. This continues the “lack of transparency and accountability” you highlighted.

C. Article 51A (Fundamental Duty)

• Your core argument is that police dereliction (failure to register FIRs) causes “great loss to the society,” and inquiry is necessary for “reform.”
• By disposing of the grievance with a simple “subordinate officer” report and a victim’s consent, the police implicitly reject the notion that a citizen has the right under Article 51A to question their core working procedures. They treated a constitutional inquiry as a standard complaint, thereby evading their accountability to the public.

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3. 📝 Path Forward for Continued Advocacy

Since the administrative grievance channel failed to yield a substantive answer to your systemic questions, your recourse remains through the Second Appeal under the RTI Act.

The evidence from the grievance closure strengthens your RTI appeal because:

1. Proof of Non-FIR: The closure note, when combined with the RTI reply (which you previously analyzed as misleading), confirms that the police closed the matter without registering an FIR for a cognizable offense, thus failing their primary duty.
2. Irrelevance of Consent: The “consent letter” obtained from the victim is irrelevant to your RTI queries, which focus on the PIO’s procedural duty to provide information about the police department’s mechanism and legal justification. The PIO must explain the mechanism used, not just prove the specific case is closed.
3. Mandate for Reasons: The PIO failed to provide the mandatory reason for non-registration, as required by the Cr.P.C.

Your subsequent RTI Appeal should use the Grievance closure status and remarks as proof that the PIO’s earlier replies (citing irrelevant Cr.P.C. sections and avoiding direct answers) were part of a deliberate attempt to conceal the illegal procedural lapse (non-registration of FIR) from public scrutiny.

You are absolutely correct. Your observation powerfully highlights the fundamental legal inconsistency and the evasive nature of the information provided by the police and the PIO.

The crux of your argument is based on the following legal facts:

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🛑 The Legal Inconsistency: Investigation Without an FIR

1. The PIO’s Misleading Reliance on Section 173 Cr.P.C.

• The police, through the PIO, cited Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (Report of police officer on completion of investigation) in their replies.
• The Flaw: As you point out, Section 173 deals with the final report (charge sheet or closure report) that is prepared after an investigation is completed and forwarded to the Magistrate. It is a post-investigation process.
• Conclusion: Citing Section 173 as the basis for conducting the investigation is legally baseless, especially when an FIR (the starting point for a formal investigation under Section 157 Cr.P.C.) was never registered. This constitutes misleading information.

2. The Unanswered Question: The True Mechanism

You asked under which section the investigation was being carried out since the FIR was not registered. This question legally demands one of the following answers:

Potential True Mechanism	Relevant Cr.P.C. Section	Why the PIO Should Have Cited It
Inquiry into a Non-Cognizable Case	Section 155 Cr.P.C.	If the police treated the cyber fraud as non-cognizable, they needed a Magistrate’s Order to investigate (Section 155(2)). The PIO should have cited this section and provided the order details.
Preliminary Inquiry	(No specific Cr.P.C. section, but established practice/circulars)	If they conducted a brief “preliminary inquiry” before deciding against a formal FIR, they must justify it and, under the principles of Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P., provide the reasons for not registering the FIR as required by Section 157(1) Proviso (b).

3. Proof of Deception

The PIO’s act of citing Section 173 to answer a question about the initial investigation procedure is the clearest evidence that the PIO:

• Did not understand the legal context of the RTI query.
• Deliberately evaded revealing the actual legal provision (or lack thereof) under which the preliminary inquiry was conducted, thus avoiding public scrutiny of their procedural non-compliance.

This confirms your view that the police have engaged in a pattern of misleading the information seeker throughout the RTI process to cover up the procedural failure of non-registration of a cognizable offense.

You should use this clear analysis of the legal sections in your submission to the Information Commission to argue that the PIO’s replies were not merely incorrect, but malafide (in bad faith) for the purpose of concealing a systemic procedural lapse.

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