🚨 Identity Theft and PAN Misuse: Unmasking a ₹37 Crore Fraud Case in India 🇮🇳

The misuse of a Permanent Account Number (PAN) is a severe form of identity theft that can lead to devastating financial and legal consequences. The case of Mr. Yogi M. P. Singh (PAN: GSWPS0850Q) from Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh, offers a stark and alarming example of such fraud, involving alleged fraudulent transactions totaling a staggering ₹370 million (₹37 Crore). This complex case, spanning multiple grievances lodged with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMOPG) and the Government of Uttar Pradesh (GOVUP), highlights critical issues in cybercrime investigation, inter-departmental coordination, and the security of personal financial identifiers.

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🔍 The Allegations: A Timeline of Misuse

The core of the grievance, filed on March 30, 2025, with the PMO, revolves around the fraudulent transactions carried out by misusing Mr. Singh’s PAN. The complainant states the fraudulent practice is still continuing, underscoring the urgency of the matter.

Financial Transactions Under Scrutiny

The Income Tax Department’s notices, issued under Section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, reveal the nature and extent of the transactions attributed to Mr. Singh’s PAN, which he claims are fraudulent:

• Financial Year 2021-22 (Assessment Year 2022-23): The initial notice dated 08/06/2023, and a similar one from March 11, 2025, highlighted a massive amount of Rent received: ₹1,27,01,673. The related Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) was approximately ₹3.4 crore, implying transactions far exceeding the reported rent.
• Other Transactions: Other records attributed to the PAN include:
  • Winnings from lottery or crossword puzzle u/s 115BB: ₹613
  • Business expenses: ₹5,70,407
  • Off-market debit transactions: ₹19,071
  • Business receipts: ₹10,63,414
  • GST turnover: ₹25,44,342

The sheer volume and diversity of these transactions—ranging from rent and business receipts to lottery winnings—strongly suggest the complainant’s identity has been extensively compromised and used to mask various illicit financial activities.

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🏢 The Corporate Links: Unverified Sources of Income

Crucially, the grievance details two specific companies named as the ‘paying body’ or ‘information source’ for attributed Rent payments, which the complainant disputes. The inclusion of these details provides concrete leads for investigation:

1. CAREFUSION DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE LIMITED (PTLC11579B)

• Attributed Amount (Rent): ₹7,76,850
• CIN: U72200CH2004PTC027506
• Registered at: RoC-Chandigarh
• Address: DLF I T PARK, TOWER D, LEVEL2, KISHANGARH CHANDIGARH CH IN 160101

2. MEGACOSM COGNITIONS PRIVATE LIMITED (DELM30192B)

• Attributed Amount (Rent): ₹3,10,683
• CIN: U52609DL2016PTC301680
• Registered at: RoC-Delhi
• Address: 57, Kalu Sarai, Begumpur Malviya Nagar New Delhi South Delhi DL IN 110017

These companies are listed as the source of payments for “Rent” in the Taxpayer Information Summary. The complainant strongly asserts these transactions are fraudulent, implicating that either the companies’ records were manipulated or their payments were incorrectly reported against his PAN. This demands verification from the respective Registrar of Companies (RoC-Chandigarh and RoC-Delhi).

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👮 Legal and Administrative Quagmire

The complainant’s repeated attempts to seek redress have led to a tangled web of official complaints and limited progress on the ground:

A. The Role of the Police

An First Information Report (FIR) bearing M.A.S. No. 291/2023 was registered on November 11, 2023, at Kotwali Katra Police Station in Mirzapur under Sections 420 (Cheating) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and 66C/66D of the Information Technology (IT) Act.

• Status: The police investigation was reported as “under progress for one year 5 months and findings are nothing.
• Closure Remark (GOVUP/E/2025/0024633): A closure report on March 27, 2025, from the Government of Uttar Pradesh, acknowledged the FIR but failed to detail substantive investigative findings, stating only that a report was received from the police station and an inspection of documents was done. The complainant marked the case as “Not Resolved.

The primary demand from the complainant to the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, is to accelerate the process of investigation and, crucially, to seek documents from Income Tax Officer Sonal Singh regarding the accounts from which the ₹3.4 crore TDS was deposited to the government treasury. This evidence is vital for tracing the true beneficiaries of the fraudulent transactions.

B. Income Tax Department’s Internal Inquiry

The grievances reveal a critical internal inquiry within the Income Tax Department’s Intelligence and Criminal Investigation (I&CI) Wing:

• Initial Action: An official communication dated December 15, 2023, from Priyanka Durbey (Addl. Director of Income Tax TPS-II) stated that inquiries were being conducted “in respect of the persons who have claimed HRA by using the PAN of the petitioner.
• Transfer of Case: The case was transferred from the ITO(I&CI) Allahabad to the ITO(I&CI) Lucknow for coordinated inquiry.
• Assurance: The officer assured that “Till the completion of relevant inquiries no further notice is being issued to Sh. MP Yogi Singh (Petitioner).” The CPGRAM matter was treated as Settled and closed based on this assurance.

However, the complainant’s later grievance (PMOPG/E/2025/0043877) states that new notices were being streamed again in March 2025 by ITO Sonal Singh, contradicting the assurance given earlier. This suggests a disconnect between the different wings of the Income Tax Department or an escalation of the underlying fraudulent activity.

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⚖️ The Path Forward: Directives for a Resolution

The lack of decisive action, despite the registration of an FIR and the sheer magnitude of the fraud, suggests a failure in coordination between the police and the income tax authorities. For a resolution, the following steps are imperative:

1. Police Investigation and Financial Trace

The Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, must be directed to make a formal, binding requisition for the following documents from the Income Tax Department’s I&CI Wing (specifically, ITO Sonal Singh):

• Bank Account Details: The source bank accounts from which the ₹3.4 crore TDS was deposited. This is the most crucial piece of evidence to identify the perpetrators.
• Information Sources: The complete Annual Information Report (AIR) documents detailing the transactions, including the contact details associated with the transactions (like the mobile number 7024188072 and email dngoldraipur18@gmail.com mentioned in MINHA/E/2023/0021424).

2. Corporate Verification

The Registrar of ComPANies (RoC-Chandigarh and RoC-Delhi) must verify the transactions reported by CAREFUSION DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE LIMITED and MEGACOSM COGNITIONS PRIVATE LIMITED against the complainant’s PAN. This will confirm if the fraudulent activity originates from the companies‘ end or through a third-party intermediary.

3. Inter-Departmental Coordination

A high-level joint meeting, perhaps mandated by the Joint Secretary concerned in the UP Chief Minister Secretariat (Shri Arvind Mohan), between the Mirzapur Police and the I&CI Wing of the Income Tax Department in Lucknow is necessary to synchronize the criminal investigation (Police) with the financial investigation (Income Tax).

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📢 Conclusion: A Call for Digital Security

The case of Mr. Yogi M. P. Singh is a severe wake-up call regarding the vulnerability of the PAN as a primary financial identifier. While the government digitizes transactions, the mechanisms to prevent and rapidly address the fraudulent misuse of foundational IDs like PAN, Aadhaar, and DIN must be robust. The complainant has diligently provided all necessary corporate details and financial figures; now, the onus is on the State and Central agencies to utilize their resources—the police for criminal tracing and the Income Tax Department for financial accountability—to unmask the syndicate behind this colossal ₹37 crore cyber fraud. Justice for the complainant hinges on the immediate and coordinated action of the authorities.

Would you like me to find the contact details for the Registrar of Companies for Chandigarh or Delhi for further investigation?