In recent years, evidently the rise of digital technology and online transactions has, unfortunately, led to an increase in cyber fraud, prompting various institutions to conduct comprehensive inquiries. For instance, one such initiative is the CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud, where the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) quietly delves into complex cases of online scams, phishing attacks, and data breaches that impact individuals and businesses alike.

As a result of this, the CBI factually employs advanced forensic techniques and collaborates with cybersecurity experts to trace fraudulent activities, analyze evidence, and ultimately bring perpetrators to justice.

Moreover, this inquiry not only aims to enhance awareness among the public about cyber threats. Additionally it instills a sense of vigilance regarding the sharing of personal and financial information online. As a result, as cyber criminals become increasingly sophisticated, the CBI’s efforts remain crucial in safeguarding digital spaces, thereby ensuring a safer online environment for all users.

📜 Summary of Grievance and Allegations

This post sets out my formal request for a CBI enquiry in cyber fraud involving the misuse of my PAN. Specifically, my grievance spans two registration numbers, PMOPG/E/2025/0036445 and PMOPG/E/2024/0184722. In both cases, I allege that an unknown fraudulent party has misused my PAN (Permanent Account Number) to carry out large-scale business transactions; consequently, they have managed to evade tax.

📌 Evidence Behind My Request for a CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud

• Fraudulent Transactions: An unknown party carried out transactions totaling ₹34,38,77,662 using my PAN. In one instance, the Income Tax Department (ITD) system flagged the following specific values:
  • Business receipts: ₹4,65,76,920
  • GST purchases: ₹12,20,99,234
  • GST turnover: ₹16,32,92,127
  • Rent received: ₹1,19,09,381
• PAN Holder Status: I, Yogi M. P. Singh, am the genuine PAN holder. However, I have never filed an income tax return, so the financial activity recorded in the Annual Information Statement (AIS) and Taxpayer Information Summary (TIS) does not belong to me.
• Fraudulent Contact Details: Obviously,the account employs a mobile number (7024188072) as well as email (dngoldraipur18@gmail.com) that, notably, link back to the fraudulent person who allegedly opened it.
• Bank Account Discrepancy: The ITD report initially claimed that “bank details are not available” for my PAN (GSWPS0850Q). Yet the system still holds extensive transaction records (TIS/AIS), which is a clear contradiction. For comparison, I gave the police my genuine bank account number with SBI (34645721675).
• Criminal Case: As a result, the police registered FIR No. 291/2023 under Section 420 IPC and Sections 66C and 66D of the IT Act against an unknown accused at Kotwali Katra police station, Mirzapur, on 11.11.2023.
• Demand for Action: Because of these failures, this is exactly why I am seeking a CBI enquiry in cyber fraud — to hold the corrupt elements within the Income Tax Department accountable and push the police to speed up their investigation.

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🏛️ Status and Departmental Actions

The documents below set out the status of both grievances and the communications I sent to various authorities.

1. Grievance PMOPG/E/2025/0036445 (Crime Related)

• Date of Receipt: 16/03/2025
• Received By: Prime Minister’s Office
• Current Status: Currently, it is under process (as of 16/03/2025)
• Officer Concerned: S. M. I. Tanvir (Addl. DG Co-ord.II), Home Affairs
• Action: This grievance appears to route the matter to the Ministry of Home Affairs for coordination, likely because of the underlying cybercrime and fraud allegations.

2. Grievance PMOPG/E/2024/0184722 (Income Tax Related)

• Date of Receipt: 25/12/2024
• Received By: Prime Minister’s Office, notably enhancing communication efficiency.
• Action by ITD: The Director of IT, Neeta Sharma, submitted a report on 13/01/2025 that attached “bank account details retrieved from the system.” However, I contest this claim, since, notably, the department’s own report elsewhere asserted that my bank details were unavailable. This contradiction finally raises concerns about the integrity of the CBI Inquiry into Cyber Fraud.
• Allegation of Failure: I consequently attribute the large-scale fraudulent transactions to significant failures at the Department of income tax, as well as the Ministry of Finance, the banking sector, and the Uttar Pradesh police.

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📊 Taxpayer Information Summary (TIS) Details

The documents include a snapshot of the TIS for the misapplied PAN, which I maintain is not my information. In particular, this summary highlights the diverse nature of the fraudulent transactions being reported against my PAN for the 2024-25 financial year.

Sr. No.	Information Category	Processed by System (INR)	Accepted by Taxpayer (INR)
1	Winnings from lottery or crossword puzzle u/s 115BB	613	613
2 (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)	Winnings from horse race u/s 115BB	733	733
3	Off market debit transactions	19,071	19,071
4	Business receipts	10,63,414	10,63,414
5	GST turnover	25,44,342	25,44,342
6	Business expenses	5,70,407	5,70,407
7	Winnings from Online Games	550	550
Total of TIS Items	(Excluding totals/duplicates)	₹43,99,130	₹43,99,130

Note: the seven TIS items above total ₹43,99,130, which is distinct from the ₹34,38,77,662 figure mentioned earlier for fraudulent business receipts, GST, and rent transactions. This gap points to the scale and complexity of the reported transactions.

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⏭️ Next Steps

Because the Income Tax Department has sent “voluminous emails in the form of notices” without resolving the case, I am now calling for escalated action, including a formal CBI enquiry in cyber fraud:

• Acceleration of Investigation: I am urging the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, to speed up the investigation, especially since the case is already registered as FIR No. 291/2023.
• CBI Enquiry: I am explicitly requesting a CBI enquiry in cyber fraud, because corruption within the system has stalled three tax evasion petitions and one FIR without result.
• Accessing Bank Records: I am thus directing the police to obtain the full bank account records behind the fraudulent transactions from Income Tax Officer Sonal Singh.

Altogether, these documents outline a serious case of identity and financial fraud, and together they build the case for a CBI enquiry in cyber fraud. They also show the administrative steps I have taken to seek justice through the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the local police.

This is a serious and frustrating situation. Since the staff handling my income tax grievances have not acted honestly or appropriately, I believe others in a similar position need to escalate the matter through formal channels to a higher authority. (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)

Below are the specific steps I recommend for effectively dealing with corrupt or unresponsive staff within the Income Tax Department (ITD).

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1. ⬆️ Escalation Within the Income Tax Department (ITD)

If the initial grievance redressal staff are uncooperative or corrupt, escalate the matter up the chain of command. (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)

Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT): As the apex body of the ITD, the CBDT allows individuals to send a direct representation to the Chairman, CBDT. In this communication, you can outline any corruption or malpractice, particularly highlighting the regional office’s failure to address the grievance honestly.

Approach the Immediate Superior: Write a formal letter detailing the issue, including the original grievance number, the date of submission, and the name and designation of the staff member who failed to act honestly. Address it to their immediate superior, such as the Joint Commissioner or Additional Commissioner of Income Tax in the relevant jurisdiction.

The Principal Chief Commissioner (PCCIT) / Chief Commissioner (CCIT): If the immediate superior is also unhelpful, escalate the complaint directly to the highest regional authority: the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (CCIT) or Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT).

This detail matters because it pinpoints the exact department the police need to coordinate with in order to access the records related to the misuse of the PAN.

Given the nature of this case — cyber fraud, PAN misuse, and large fraudulent transactions — the police request to the CBDT (New Delhi) should go to the Prayagraj (formerly Allahabad) Intelligence and Criminal Investigation (I&CI) Wing, since this wing investigates serious tax evasion and criminal tax matters.

Below is the relevant contact information for the authorities involved, which may help the police or my own follow-up.

🏛️ Key CBDT and I&CI Contacts (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)

Because Prayagraj (Allahabad) falls under the jurisdiction of Uttar Pradesh (East), the local I&CI office there and the central Directorate in New Delhi are both relevant.

1. Central Directorate of Income Tax (I&CI), New Delhi (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)

This is the apex body responsible for all Intelligence & Criminal Investigation activities across India. Consequently, the CBDT would forward the police request through this office to the regional unit.

Role	Name (Current/Recent)	Phone Number (Office)	Email ID
Director General of IT (I&CI)	Ms. Himalini Kashyap (or current DG)	011-24363577	dgit.icinv@incometax.gov.in
Pr. DGIT (I&CI) Office Address	2nd floor, Jawahar Lal Nehru stadium, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003	See phone above	See email above

2. Regional I&CI Office: Prayagraj (Allahabad) (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)

The Prayagraj I&CI office directly holds, or can access, the granular records — such as the TIS/AIS and original investigation files — related to the fraudulent use of the PAN in that region.

Role	Location Details	DDO Code (Internal ID)
Income Tax Officer (I&CI)	Located within the jurisdiction of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (CCIT), Allahabad / Prayagraj	206470 (ITO (ICI), Allahabad)

Note on the Prayagraj contact: specific phone numbers for the ITO (I&CI), Prayagraj are not consistently published in the central directory. Therefore, requests should go via the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, to the Pr. CCIT in Prayagraj/Lucknow, with a copy marked to the DGIT (I&CI) in New Delhi, to ensure they reach the right authority quickly.

📝 Recommended Action for the Police (CBI Enquiry in Cyber Fraud)

Since the police have already sent a request, the following steps are crucial for the investigation’s success:

• Follow Up: Consequently, the Mirzapur police station should follow up their written request with a phone call to the Director General of IT (I&CI) in New Delhi (011-24363577), thereby confirming that the request has reached the correct regional office.
• Direct Contact to Prayagraj: At the same time, the police should send a copy of the request directly to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Prayagraj, clearly citing the fraudulent PAN (GSWPS0850Q), the FIR details (No. 291/2023), and the need for the source bank account details behind the TIS/AIS entries.
• Specify the Information Needed: The police request must explicitly demand the Source Bank Account Details that generated the data behind the huge transactions (Rs. 34,38,77,662 and the TIS entries) linked to the PAN, since this is the crucial link to identifying the fraudsters.