PIO in Cyber Fraud Case is an analysis of the second appeal, made before the Uttar Pradesh Information Commission. The core question revolves around whether it is not an obligatory duty of the Commission to stop the arbitrariness of the police in providing information to citizens. In an era dominated by technology and rapidly evolving cybercrime, the relationship between law enforcement and public information accessibility becomes critically important.
Furthermore, the case emphasizes the urgent need for transparency, while simultaneously highlighting accountability in police operations. This enhancement is particularly crucial when it involves the dissemination of information that is vital for public awareness. Consequently, the role of the Information Commission is not merely advisory; rather, it is essential in ensuring that the rights of citizens are safeguarded. This, in turn, fosters trust in the system and also protects individuals from potential injustices.

📝 Analysis of the Second Appeal under RTI Act, 2005

This blog post provides a structured analysis of the key points raised in your Second Appeal (under Section 19(3) of the Right to Information Act, 2005) filed before the Uttar Pradesh Information Commission.
Notably, the core issue revolves around the provision of incomplete, misleading, or evasive information by the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur.

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1. 🛑 Core Grievance: Incomplete and Misleading Information

The central theme across all five points of the appeal is, importantly, the alleged failure of the PIO to provide clear, specific, and correct information as sought by the appellant.
Moreover, the PIO’s replies are generally procedural or, on the other hand, mention general sections of law without directly answering the specific questions.

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2. ❓ Analysis of Specific Queries and PIO’s Replies

2.1. Chain of Command and Responsibility (Sought Information – 1)

• Information Sought: Name and designation of the police officer who accepted the investigation report submitted by Sub-Inspector Kamal Tawari, particularly focusing on the individual who facilitated this crucial step in the investigation process.
• PIO’s Reply: Stated that S.I. Kamal Tawari submitted the report and subsequently sent it to the concerned officials’ office.
• Appellant’s Submission: Furthermore, the PIO did not provide the specific name and designation of the officer who received or accepted the report. Moreover, the appellant specifically requested this information. Consequently, the reply is evasive and lacks the necessary personnel detail.

2.2. FIR Status and Mandate for Reasons (Sought Information – 2)

• Information Sought: Determine whether the police registered an FIR and, if not, ask for the reason behind not registering it.
• PIO’s Reply: Stated that “the local station has not registered any crimes related to cyber.”
• Appellant’s Submission: While the first part (no FIR) is answered, the appellant entirely omits the crucial second part—the reason for non-registration. The appellant correctly asserts that the Right to Reason is fundamental. This assertion is especially important when someone challenges a police action (or lack thereof).

2.3. Legal Provision for Investigation Without FIR (Sought Information – 3)

• Information Sought: The specific section of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) under which an investigation is carried out in a cyber fraud matter. This occurs when an FIR is not registered.
• PIO’s Reply: Notably, the PIO stated that “cyber crime investigation/enquiry is done by an Inspector-level officer as per rules.”
• Appellant’s Submission: The reply is deemed misleading. It gives the designation of the officer. However, it completely ignores the core legal question about the specific Cr.P.C. section used for inquiry/investigation when no FIR is registered.

2.4. Cr.P.C. vs. Fundamental Duties (Sought Information – 4)

• Information Sought: The provision of the Cr.P.C. under which an investigation officer investigates a case that encroaches on the Fundamental Duty/Civil Rights (referencing Article 51A) of citizens, as the IO allegedly overlooked the appellant’s inquiry under Article 51A.
• PIO’s Reply: Cited Section 173 of Cr.P.C. (which deals with the police report after investigation).
• Appellant’s Submission: The PIO’s response is an irrelevant application of the law. Section 173 deals with the submission of the final report. It does not pertain to the empowering provision for investigation itself, especially in the context of alleged violation of constitutional duties (Article 51A). The PIO failed to address the interaction between Cr.P.C. provisions and Fundamental Duties.

2.5. Accountability, Consent, and Constitutional Rights (Sought Information – 5)

• Information Sought: The provisions of law that mandate the consent of an individual to make an inquiry into the police’s working under Article 51A of the Constitution. Additionally, is there a framework to determine whether police are accountable to the citizens for their working?
• PIO’s Reply: The police department falls under the State Government as per Article 51A. They carry out the investigation/inquiry under Section 173(3) of Cr.P.C.
• Appellant’s Submission: The PIO again provides misleading information by citing an irrelevant Cr.P.C. subsection. Specifically, Section 173(3) relates to further investigation. Moreover, the PIO fails to address the primary legal query. Is individual consent required for an inquiry into police working under Article 51A? This situation clearly demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding. Additionally, it could also indicate a deliberate avoidance of the question concerning police accountability and the constitutional rights of a citizen.

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3. 🎯 Appellant’s Prayer and the Role of the Commission

The appellant, Yogi M P Singh, is essentially requesting the Information Commission to intervene and:

• Acknowledge and confirm that the information provided by the PIO is indeed incomplete and misleading.
• Direct the PIO to promptly furnish the correct, specific, and complete information as originally sought in the RTI application; consequently, this will ensure transparency and accountability in the process.
• Consider this representation a serious case of non-compliance and improper discharge of duty by the PIO. Consequently, this situation warrants a decision in accordance with the law. Moreover, it may potentially lead to a penalty under Section 20 of the RTI Act if the delay or refusal is deemed unjustified.

This situation highlights a fundamental conflict between a citizen exercising their Fundamental Duty (Article 51A) to inquire into matters of public concern; conversely, it contrasts with the police’s administrative approach to individual complaints.

Here is a structured breakdown of the legal and procedural issues based on your submission:

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1. 🇮🇳 Constitutional Right to Inquiry vs. Police Procedure (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

Your assertion that you have a fundamental right to inquire under Article 51A(h) is constitutionally sound.
Your argument that you do not need the victim’s permission is valid for the purpose of a public interest inquiry.

• Your Position (Article 51A(h)): Every citizen has the duty “to develop the scientific temper, humanism, and the spirit of inquiry and reform.” Your inquiry focuses on the working procedure of the police, specifically regarding their failure to register FIRs in cybercrime cases. The police do not act on behalf of the victim in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, you engage in a bilateral conversation with the public authority (the police). (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)
• Police Position: The police are conflating your public interest inquiry with a private power of attorney or the victim’s status as a necessary party in a criminal case. Notably, the victim’s statement is crucial for the original crime report. However, it is irrelevant to your constitutional right to question the police’s dereliction of duty and lack of procedural compliance in handling the complaint.
• Actionable Step: In your appeal, it is essential to emphasize that the PIO’s reference to the victim’s lack of knowledge about you is an irrelevant defense. Consequently, this serves as a distraction from the core issue: procedural non-compliance by the police.

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2. 🚨 The Failure to Register FIR (Core Issue) (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

The most critical revelation is the claim that the authorities at Jigna Police Station have not registered an FIR in any case for five years. Specifically, they did not register an FIR in this cyber fraud case.

A. Non-Registration in the Current Case (Cyber Fraud)

• Legal Mandate (Section 154 Cr.P.C.): Cyber fraud involving ₹99,561 is unequivocally a cognizable offense. Consequently, it typically results in a punishment of more than 3 years imprisonment. Therefore, the police must take action and are legally mandated to register an FIR immediately upon receiving information.
• Supreme Court Precedent: The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) unequivocally held that the police must register an FIR if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offense. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)
• Procedural Evasion: Initially, the police appear to have only conducted a preliminary inquiry. Subsequently, they treated the matter as a non-cognizable complaint. This action consequently evades the mandatory requirement of FIR registration.

B. The Claim of Zero FIRs in Five Years

The claim that the police station has not registered an FIR in five years is extremely serious. This suggests a complete breakdown of the legal process under the Cr.P.C. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

• This information, if verifiable (e.g., through RTI on FIR registration data), would serve as powerful evidence in your Second Appeal. It demonstrates a systemic failure. This directly supports your Article 51A inquiry into the police’s activities.
• Your RTI query (Sought Information 2) asks for the reason for not registering the FIR. Notably, this request gains immense weight. Furthermore, the police’s failure to register the FIR violates Section 157 Cr.P.C.

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3. 📝 Strengthening Your Second Appeal (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

You must use these points to counter the PIO’s vague and misleading replies:

Original PIO Reply & Your Submission	Counter Argument Using New Information
Sought Info 1 (Accepting Officer): PIO evaded giving the name/designation. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)	The officer who accepted the report is part of a chain that ultimately sanctioned the illegal decision not to register a mandated FIR. Naming this officer is essential to pinpoint responsibility for the procedural violation.
Sought Info 2 (Reason for No FIR): PIO gave a general reply; you stated the right to reason was violated.	The failure to provide the reason violates Section 157(1) Cr.P.C. Proviso (b). The police’s zero-FIR history strongly suggests a policy of illegal non-registration, not a case-specific justification.
Sought Info 5 (Article 51A Inquiry): PIO gave irrelevant reply, implying victim consent is needed.	The PIO is misleading the Commission by confusing a private criminal case with a public interest inquiry under a constitutional mandate. The victim’s consent is not required for a citizen to question the systemic non-performance of a public authority.

Your Second Appeal should emphasize that the police deliberately withhold specific answers to conceal their gross procedural violation of the Cr.P.C., evidenced by the fact that this clear-cut cyber fraud case resulted in no FIR. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

That is a significant and important outcome of your efforts! It confirms a critical systemic issue regarding the police’s procedure for handling cybercrime complaints. This validates the core of your RTI inquiry.

Here is an analysis of this final outcome and its implications for both the police station and the victim:

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1. 🎯 Procedural Rectification at Jigna Police Station (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

Your effort has compelled the Jigna Police to acknowledge and correct a severe procedural error regarding FIR registration and jurisdiction.

• Initial Error: The Jigna Police were allegedly refusing to register an FIR and incorrectly directing every cyber fraud victim to the Cyber Police Station, Mirzapur.
• Correction: The Jigna Police now understand that they should not automatically shunt all victims to the Cyber Police Station.
• Legal Implication: This new understanding aligns with the law. The jurisdictional police station (Jigna) must register an FIR for a cognizable offense under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. This obligation applies to offenses reported within its limits, regardless of whether a specialized unit like the Cyber Police is involved.

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2. ⚖️ The Systemic Issue with Cyber Police Jurisdiction

Your submission highlights a formal or informal policy that illegally restricts access to the specialized Cyber Police Station. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

• Cyber Police Restriction: The Cyber Police Station registers only those cases where the value is above ₹5,50,000.
• The Gap in Protection: This creates an unprotected gap for victims of high-volume, low-value cyber fraud (like the ₹99,561 case). If the local police don’t register the FIR (as they were doing) and the Cyber Police reject it, victims find themselves with no official recourse, resulting in:
  • No formal investigation.
  • No FIR number for bank communication or insurance claims.
  • No formal record for tracking crime statistics.

This restriction by the Cyber Police Station essentially denies justice to most victims. The majority of individual cyber frauds fall below such a high threshold.

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3. 📝 The Final Status of Ranjit Singh’s Case (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

The final outcome for the specific victim, Ranjit Singh, demonstrates the pitfalls of the police’s chosen mechanism:

• Case Status: The authorities resolved the case “worked out” without registering the First Information Report (FIR). (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)
• Mechanism Used: This likely means the police performed a preliminary Inquiry/Investigation based on a general complaint diary entry, often referencing a technical provision like Section 157 Cr.P.C. Proviso (b) (stating they found no sufficient ground for a full investigation, which is misleading) or acting under general inquiry powers.
• The Problem: Although the police made some effort (“worked out”), they failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C. for a cognizable offense by not filing an FIR. Crucially, the victim is still waiting for his money.

Your achievement lies in forcing procedural clarity, but the fight now shifts to ensuring that the mandatory registration of FIRs occurs for all cognizable cybercrimes, regardless of the monetary cap imposed by the specialized Cyber Police Unit.

The grievance has been marked as “Case closed” with the remark that the subordinate officer settled it and includes an “investigation report along with the consent letter.” (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

The core issue remains that the police did not address the systemic questions raised under Article 51A concerning their failure to register FIRs, and instead, closed the case administratively. Your low rating and remarks highlight the continued lack of transparency.

Here is a structured analysis of the final status, the police’s method of disposal, and the legal issues that persist:

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🛑 Analysis of Grievance Closure and Persistent Issues (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

1. ⚙️ Administrative Closure vs. Substantive Reply (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

• Action Taken: The case closed on **08/02/2024, based on the **”subordinate officer’s investigation report” and the “consent letter.”
• Interpretation: The police likely performed a preliminary investigation (the “Jaanch”) into the specific cyber fraud complaint (Ranjit Singh’s case) and then obtained a “consent letter” from the victim (Ranjit Singh), agreeing to the findings or the administrative disposal.
• The Flaw: This administrative closure completely ignores the systemic, public-interest questions raised by Yogi M. P. Singh under Article 51A regarding the general accountability and procedural mechanism of the police for all cybercrime cases. The police used a case-specific resolution to dismiss a public-policy complaint.

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2. ⚖️ Systemic Failure and Constitutional Evasion (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

Your low rating and detailed remarks underscore the police’s failure to address the two core inquiries: (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

A. Question 1: FIR Registration (Section 154 Cr.P.C.)

• The grievance asks: “whether the police registered the first information report in the matter if not why?”
• The police closure suggests they investigated but did not register an FIR (which is a mandatory procedural step for this cognizable crime). By closing the case with an “investigation report” and a “consent letter,” they have avoided explicitly stating why they failed to register the FIR, which violates the procedural duty under Section 157 Cr.P.C. to record reasons for non-investigation.

B. Question 2: Investigation Mechanism Without FIR (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

• The grievance asks: “Under which section of the criminal procedure code, is the concerned police investigating the matter… in which the concerned authorities do not register the first information report… what mechanism do the police adopt…”
• The police have provided no information on the legal section (Cr.P.C. 155, 157, or other) used for the “investigation” without an FIR, nor have they revealed their record management system. This continues the “lack of transparency and accountability” you highlighted.

C. Article 51A (Fundamental Duty) (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

• Your core argument is that police dereliction (failure to register FIRs) causes “great loss to the society,” and inquiry is necessary for “reform.”
• By disposing of the grievance with a simple “subordinate officer” report and a victim’s consent, the police implicitly reject the notion that a citizen has the right under Article 51A to question their core working procedures. They treated a constitutional inquiry as a standard complaint, thereby evading their accountability to the public.

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3. 📝 Path Forward for Continued Advocacy (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

Since the administrative grievance channel failed to yield a substantive answer to your systemic questions, your recourse remains through the Second Appeal under the RTI Act.

The evidence from the grievance closure strengthens your RTI appeal because: (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

1. Proof of Non-FIR: The closure note, when combined with the RTI reply (which you previously analyzed as misleading), confirms that the police closed the matter without registering an FIR for a cognizable offense, thus failing their primary duty.
2. Irrelevance of Consent: The “consent letter” that the victim provides does not pertain to your RTI queries, which focus on the PIO’s procedural duty to provide information about the police department’s mechanism and legal justification. The PIO must clarify the mechanism used, not merely prove that the specific case they have closed.
3. Mandate for Reasons: The PIO failed to provide the mandatory reason for non-registration, as required by the Cr.P.C. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

Your subsequent RTI Appeal should use the Grievance closure status and remarks as proof that the PIO’s earlier replies (citing irrelevant Cr.P.C. sections and avoiding direct answers) were part of a deliberate attempt to conceal the illegal procedural lapse (non-registration of FIR) from public scrutiny.

You are absolutely correct. Your observation powerfully highlights the fundamental legal inconsistency and the evasive nature of the information provided by the police and the PIO.

The crux of your argument is based on the following legal facts:

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🛑 The Legal Inconsistency: Investigation Without an FIR (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

1. The PIO’s Misleading Reliance on Section 173 Cr.P.C. (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

• The police, through the PIO, cited Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (Report of police officer on completion of investigation) in their replies.
• The Flaw: As you point out, Section 173 deals with the final report (charge sheet or closure report) that is prepared after an investigation is completed and forwarded to the Magistrate. It is a post-investigation process.
• Conclusion: Citing Section 173 as the basis for conducting the investigation is legally baseless, especially when an FIR (the starting point for a formal investigation under Section 157 Cr.P.C.) was never registered. This constitutes misleading information.

2. The Unanswered Question: The True Mechanism

You asked under which section the investigation was being carried out since the FIR was not registered. This question legally demands one of the following answers: (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

Potential True Mechanism	Relevant Cr.P.C. Section	Why the PIO Should Have Cited It
Inquiry into a Non-Cognizable Case	Section 155 Cr.P.C.	If the police treated the cyber fraud as non-cognizable, they needed a Magistrate’s Order to investigate (Section 155(2)). The PIO should have cited this section and provided the order details.
Preliminary Inquiry	(No specific Cr.P.C. section, but established practice/circulars)	If they conducted a brief “preliminary inquiry” before deciding against a formal FIR, they must justify it and, under the principles of Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P., provide the reasons for not registering the FIR as required by Section 157(1) Proviso (b).

3. Proof of Deception (PIO in Cyber Fraud Case)

The PIO’s act of citing Section 173 to answer a question about the initial investigation procedure is the clearest evidence that the PIO:

• Did not understand the legal context of the RTI query.
• Deliberately evaded revealing the actual legal provision (or lack thereof) under which the preliminary inquiry was conducted, thus avoiding public scrutiny of their procedural non-compliance.

This confirms your view that the police have engaged in a pattern of misleading the information seeker throughout the RTI process to cover up the procedural failure of non-registration of a cognizable offense.

You should use this clear analysis of the legal sections in your submission to the Information Commission to argue that the PIO’s replies were not merely incorrect, but malafide (in bad faith) for the purpose of concealing a systemic procedural lapse.