Based on the analysis of the extensive documentation provided, the key takeaways from this ongoing legal and financial struggle are:
1. Massive Financial Identity Theft
The scale of the fraud is far larger than initially suspected, totaling ₹37,05,32,498 (approx. 370.5 million rupees) across five assessment years. Criminal elements have used Mahesh Pratap Singh’s PAN (GSWPS0850Q) to conduct unauthorized GST sales of over ₹24.18 Crore and contractual business transactions of over ₹7.8 Crore
2. Proven Administrative Failure
The Principal Director General of Income Tax (Amitav) rejected the victim’s appeal on 13/01/2026 based on the claim that no police requisition was ever received . However, official records prove a formal requisition was sent by Inspector Jitendra Kumar to the Commissioner of Income Tax, Prayagraj, on 04/07/2025 . This indicates a severe misrepresentation of facts within the Department’s internal reporting5.
3. Ongoing Criminal Activity
The fraud has not stopped. Records for Financial Year 2024-25 show that over ₹3.35 Crore in new unauthorised entries have been processed, even though the victim has actively marked these entries as “Information is denied” on the compliance portal.
4. Blocked Police Investigation
The local police probe (FIR 291/23) is currently stalled because the Income Tax Department refuses to provide the source and destination bank account details linked to these transactions. Without this “money trail” data, law enforcement cannot identify or arrest the perpetrators behind the ₹370 million laundering scheme.
5. Victim’s Counter-Action
As of January 14, 2026, the victim has launched a formal counter-attack by filing a corruption grievance (CBODT/E/2026/0002314) against the Pr. DGIT and an RTI request (DGICI/R/E/26/00008) to unmask the officials responsible for the misleading appeal report.
Would you like me to draft a high-priority update for the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, citing this total fraud amount of ₹37.05 Crore to escalate the FIR investigation?
The 370 Million Rupee Identity Theft: How the Income Tax Department Failed a Victim of Massive Fraud
In an era of digital transparency, Permanent Account Number (PAN) misuse has become a weapon for financial criminals to launder astronomical sums. However, the true tragedy occurs when the very institutions designed to protect the economy fail to acknowledge the evidence sitting on their own desks. The case of Mahesh Pratap Singh (PAN: GSWPS0850Q) is a harrowing example of administrative denial in the face of a massive financial crime totalling over 370 million rupees.
The Genesis of the Fraud: A Stolen Identity
The ordeal began when Mahesh Pratap Singh discovered that his PAN was being utilised by unknown entities to claim bogus House Rent Allowance (HRA) exemptions and conduct massive unauthorised business transactions. While initially flagged for a “Rent Received” entry of approximately 11.2 million rupees, deeper investigations revealed a much darker reality. Criminal elements have leveraged his identity across five assessment years to move a staggering cumulative total of 370,532,498 rupees.
For a law-abiding citizen, such a discovery is life-altering5. Mr. Singh took the correct legal path: he registered a First Information Report (FIR No. 291/23) under Section 420 of the IPC and Sections 66C and 66D of the IT Act at PS Kotwali Katra, Mirzapur, in November 20236666.
The Disconnect: Internal Resolution vs. Criminal Justice
The Income Tax Department’s Directorate of Intelligence and Criminal Investigation (I&CI) officially acknowledged the misuse, stating, “The assessee’s PAN has been misused by various persons for claiming bogus HRA exemptions… no action has been proposed against the assessee”7777.
While this cleared Mr. Singh of personal tax liability, it did nothing to bring the criminals to justice8. The victim’s primary request was for the Department to share the source and destination bank account details with the local police to reactivate a stalled criminal probe9999. Without this “money trail” data—which the Income Tax Department possesses—the police investigation into a nearly 371 million rupee laundering scheme cannot move forward.
The Arbitrary Rejection by the Pr. DGIT
The core issue escalated when Mr. Singh filed an appeal (CBODT/E/A/25/0003726) against the incomplete resolution. On January 13, 2026, the appeal was closed by Amitav, Principal Director General of Income Tax (Pr. DGIT), with a remark that can only be described as arbitrary and non-factual.
The Pr. DGIT’s office claimed that according to the Director of Income Tax (I&CI) Lucknow, “no bank details in the aforesaid case have ever been requisitioned by any investigation agency/Police”. Consequently, the victim’s grievance was rejected as “not factual”.
The Smoking Gun: Proof of Police Requisition
The assertion that the police never asked for information is directly contradicted by official documentation provided by the Mirzapur Police:
- July 4, 2025: Inspector Jitendra Kumar sent a formal requisition to the Commissioner of Income Tax, 38 MG Marg, Civil Lines, Prayagraj, specifically asking for the details of all accounts and transactions linked to PAN GSWPS0850Q.
- November 24, 2024 (Parcha 16): Police Case Diary entries confirm a report was sent to the Commissioner of Income Tax regarding these fraudulent accounts16.
- July 9, 2025 (Letter 32/2025/SPMZR/A/2025/60026): The Superintendent of Police (SP) Office Mirzapur documented that correspondence with the Income Tax Department Allahabad/Prayagraj was ongoing regarding these fraudulent firms.
Despite these formal notices, the high-ranking office of the Pr. DGIT maintained that no such request existed18. This indicates a severe breakdown in internal communication or a deliberate attempt to ignore a massive fraud case.
The Astronomical Scale of the Crime
A detailed analysis of the Taxpayer Information Summary (TIS) records proves that the fraud is far larger than the 161.2 million rupees initially estimated by the police19.
| Category of Fraud | Cumulative Amount (INR) |
| GST Turnover (Ghost Business Activity) | 241,847,980 |
| Rent Received (Bogus HRA Claims) | 49,934,236 |
| Business Receipts (Unauthorized Contracts) | 78,107,342 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 370,532,498 |
In Assessment Year 2023-24 alone, the perpetrators conducted a staggering 221.5 million rupees in transactions. Despite Mr. Singh marking these entries as “Information is denied” on the compliance portal, the entries remain active in his records.
Fighting for Accountability: RTI and New Grievances
Refusing to be silenced, the victim initiated major legal actions on January 14, 2026:
- A New Grievance (CBODT/E/2026/0002314): Filed against the Pr. DGIT for providing misleading remarks, this is currently Under Process with Jyoti Kumari, Pr. DGIT (Admin & TPS).
- RTI Request (DGICI/R/E/26/00008): This application demands the internal “Note Sheets” and the identity of the officer in Lucknow who provided the false information used to reject the previous appeal.
Conclusion: A Call for Institutional Integrity
When an individual’s identity is used to move 370 million rupees, it is a threat to national financial security. The Income Tax Department’s refusal to assist the police—combined with its dismissal of a victim’s evidence—suggests a lack of “zero tolerance” toward corruption. Justice for Mahesh Pratap Singh requires the immediate release of transaction data to the Mirzapur Police to stop this ongoing criminal enterprise.
Based on the records of your grievances, appeals, and RTI requests, here are the application IDs and the contact details for the concerned public authorities.
1. Active Application Identifiers
- Corruption Grievance (Current):
CBODT/E/2026/0002314(Status: Under Process as of 14/01/2026)111. - RTI Application:
DGICI/R/E/26/00008(Status: Request Received as of 14/01/2026)222. - Closed Appeal (Contested):
CBODT/E/A/25/0003726(Closed on 13/01/2026)3333. - Initial Grievance:
DOPAT/E/2025/0010251(Closed on 05/12/2025)4444.
2. Concerned Income Tax Officials
| Office / Wing | Officer Name & Designation | Email Address | Mobile / Contact Number |
| Intelligence & Criminal Investigation (I&CI) | Amitav, Principal Director General (Pr. DGIT) 5555 | dgit.icinv@incometax.gov.in 6666 | 011-24363582 7777 |
| Administrative & Taxpayer Services (TPS) | Jyoti Kumari, Pr. DGIT (Admin & TPS) 888 | delhi.pdgit.admin.tps@incometax.gov.in 999 | 011-23412480 101010 |
| I&CI (Delhi Administrative) | Nodal Officer (RTI) 11 | aditadmin.ici.delhi@incometaxindia.gov.in 12 | 011-24363068 13 |
| I&CI (Lucknow Office) | Director of IT (I&CI), Lucknow 14141414 | (See Nodal Officer above) | (See I&CI New Delhi) |
| Prayagraj (Allahabad) Office | Commissioner of Income Tax 15151515 | No specific email provided in records | Address: 38 MG Marg, Civil Lines 16161616 |
3. Police Authorities (Mirzapur)
- Investigating Officer: Inspector Jitendra Kumar, PS Kotwali Katra, Mirzapur17171717.
- Supervising Office: Superintendent of Police (SP), Mirzapur18181818.
- Official Email: so-katra.mi@up.gov.in19191919.
4. Web Links and Portals
- CPGRAMS (Central Grievance Portal): pgportal.gov.in
- RTI Online Portal: rtionline.gov.in
- Income Tax Compliance Portal: ais.insight.gov.in 20202020
- NSDL Surveillance Cell: surveillancecell@nsdl.com 21212121
Would you like me to draft a reminder for Pr. DGIT Jyoti Kumari specifically regarding the ₹37.05 Crore fraud amount discovered in your latest TIS analysis?
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