🚨 Arbitrary Denial of Information: A Case Study in RTI Misapplication

RTI Second Appeal Highlights Misinterpretation of ‘Archival’ Information

The Second Appeal filed by Smt. Sadhana Tiwari (Registration No. UPICR20240007679) before the UTTAR PRADESH INFORMATION COMMISSION brings to light a critical issue in the implementation of the Right to Information Act, 2005: the arbitrary denial of information based on a narrow and questionable interpretation of what constitutes ‘information’ under the Act.

The appellant, Sadhana Tiwari, sought specific details regarding the compliance of an order passed by the Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission (UPHRC) by the Office of the Superintendent of Police (SP), Mirzapur.

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🧐 The Information Sought: UPHRC Order Compliance

The appellant’s requests, submitted via a Section 6(1) application, focused on the processing and action taken on the UPHRC order dated 05/09/2024 (Diary No. 3613/IN/2024).

The key pieces of information requested were:

1. Name and designation of the staff who received the UPHRC order.
2. Notings made on the communication of the order.
3. Action Taken Report (ATR) on the order.
4. Reason if no order or action was taken.
5. Name and designation of staff who processed the communication and those currently processing it.

Essentially, the appellant was seeking documents and records created and held by the SP Office concerning a directive from a statutory body.

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❌ The Ground for Denial: Misinterpreting Section 2(j)

Both the Public Information Officer (PIO) and the First Appellate Authority (FAA) rejected the request. The crucial point of contention is the PIO’s specific reason for denial, as stated in the reply:

It is impossible to provide the information as the information sought by you is not archival.

Relief Sought: “you should ask for archival information so that the information can be made available to you.”

What Section 2(j) Actually States

Section 2(j) of the RTI Act defines the “right to information” as:

…the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority…

Crucially, the Act does not limit the definition of ‘information’ to only ‘archival’ records. The information sought—such as the receipt register entry, internal notings, and action taken reports—are documents created and held by the public authority in the due course of its work, making them accessible records under the control of the SP’s office.

The appellant correctly argues that the PIO’s claim that the UPHRC order is “not a part of documents” or “not archival” is a “false and flimsy ground” reflecting an arbitrary attempt to withhold public records.

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⏳ Procedural Lapses: Delays and Mockery of the Act

Beyond the substantive denial, the appeal also highlights significant procedural violations regarding the statutory timelines:

• RTI Application (Section 6(1)): Filed on 09/10/2024. Status disposed of on 21/02/2025 (a delay of 4 months and 10 days).
• First Appeal (Section 19(1)): Filed on 21/11/2024. Status disposed of on 02/02/2025 (a delay of 2 months and 10 days).

The appellant rightly calls these delays a “mockery of the provisions of the right to information act 2005,” as the Act mandates a 30-day response period for RTI applications and a similar timely disposal for appeals.

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🎯 Relief Sought: Accountability and Compliance

The primary relief sought by the appellant is twofold:

1. Direct the Public Authority to provide the requested information concerning the UPHRC order compliance.
2. Take action against the PIO under the RTI Act for denying the information on a “false and flimsy ground,” reflecting “insolence to the provisions of the right to information act 2005.

This case underscores the vital role of the Information Commission in correcting procedural misconduct and ensuring that public authorities do not erect artificial barriers, like the misinterpretation of ‘archival,’ to frustrate the citizen’s fundamental right to information.

⚖️ Penalties and Duties of a Public Information Officer (PIO) under the RTI Act, 2005

The Second Appeal highlights both a violation of the statutory duty to provide information and a significant failure to adhere to prescribed timelines. The Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005, through Section 20, provides the State Information Commission (SIC) with the power to impose strict penalties on Public Information Officers (PIOs) for such contraventions.

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1. Mandatory Duties of the PIO (Section 5 and Section 7)

The core responsibilities of a PIO are centered on ensuring timely and accurate access to information. In the context of the Appeal, the PIO appears to have failed on several key duties:

Duty of the PIO	Relevant Section/Timeline	Violation in the Appeal
Timely Response	Section 7(1): To provide information or reject the request as expeditiously as possible, and in any case within 30 days of receipt.	The RTI application was filed on 09/10/2024 but was only disposed of on 21/02/2025, a delay of over 4 months and 10 days.
Reasoned Rejection	Section 7(8): If the request is rejected, the PIO must communicate the reasons for such rejection, the period for appeal, and the particulars of the Appellate Authority.	The PIO provided a reason based on a misinterpretation of Section 2(j) (stating the information was “not archival”), which constitutes a denial on a non-statutory or “flimsy” ground.
Seeking Assistance	Section 5(4): The PIO may seek assistance from any other officer. The officer whose assistance is sought is considered a ‘Deemed PIO’ for the purposes of penalty.	The appeal notes that the matter was improperly denied rather than transferred or processed, suggesting a failure in internal information management.

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2. Penalty Provisions for the PIO (Section 20)

The State Information Commission (SIC) has powers under Section 20 of the RTI Act to enforce compliance and penalize PIOs who fail in their duties without reasonable cause.

A. Imposition of Penalty (Section 20(1))

The SIC can impose a penalty on the PIO for various infractions, including:

• Refused to receive an application.
• Has not furnished information within the specified time (30 days).
• Malafidely denied the request for information.
• Knowingly given incorrect, incomplete, or misleading information.
• Destroyed information that was the subject of the request.
• Obstructed in any manner the furnishing of information.

Penalty Details	Provision
Daily Fine	₹250 per day (Rs. $250/-$ per day) until the information is furnished or the application is received.
Maximum Limit	Subject to a maximum limit of ₹25,000 (Rs. $25,000/-$).
Liability	The penalty is imposed on the PIO personally and must be paid from their salary, not by the public authority.
Burden of Proof	The PIO bears the burden of proving that they acted reasonably and diligently and that the delay or denial was for a reasonable cause.

In the case of Smt. Tiwari’s appeal, the 4-month delay in responding and the denial on the basis of a non-existent ‘archival’ requirement fall under the grounds of “not furnished information within the time specified” and “malafidely denied the request.”

B. Recommendation for Disciplinary Action (Section 20(2))

In addition to imposing a fine, if the SIC is of the opinion that the PIO has persistently failed in their duties (without reasonable cause), the Commission may recommend disciplinary action against the PIO under the service rules applicable to them.

Key Takeaway for the Appeal

Smt. Tiwari’s appeal is strengthened by the specific inclusion of a prayer for action against the PIO. The SIC, upon hearing the case, will likely focus on two areas that justify penalty under Section 20:

1. The Gross Delay: The delay of over four months clearly violates the 30-day mandate.
2. The ‘Archival’ Denial: The reason provided for denial is not a valid exemption under the RTI Act, indicating either a gross failure to understand the law or a deliberate attempt to obstruct information (a malafide denial).

The Information Commission has the final authority to determine if the PIO acted “without any reasonable cause” and to impose the corresponding penalty.

🔎 Legal Interpretation: The Scope of ‘Information’ under the RTI Act

The PIO’s reason for denial—that the requested details are “not archival”—is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the Right to Information Act, 2005, and is highly likely to be overruled by the State Information Commission (SIC).

The statutory definitions of ‘Information’ and ‘Right to Information’ in the Act are exceptionally broad, covering far more than just “archival” or old records.

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1. The Definitive Scope of ‘Information’ (Section 2(f))

The RTI Act provides an inclusive definition of what constitutes “information.” The language used is key:

• Section 2(f) defines “information” as “any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form…”
• Section 2(i) further defines “record” to explicitly include “any document, manuscript and file.”

The specific items requested by Smt. Tiwari are:

• Name/designation of staff who received the UPHRC order (Found in a logbook or inward receipt register).
• Notings made on the communication (Part of the file/document).
• Action Taken Report (ATR) on the order (A record, document, or report).
• Reason for no action (An advice, opinion, or record/memo explaining the decision).

All these items fall squarely within the explicit list of materials covered by Section 2(f) and 2(i). There is no requirement in the Act for a document to be “archival” (old or retired) to be considered ‘information.’ In fact, current and live records, such as file notings and an Action Taken Report (ATR), are precisely the kind of material the Act intends to make accessible to promote transparency in administration.

2. The Mandate of ‘Right to Information’ (Section 2(j))

The definition of the right itself broadens the scope, clarifying that the information must be in the possession of the public authority:

• Section 2(j) defines “right to information” as the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority…

This phrase, “held by or under the control of,” simply means the information must physically exist in the public authority’s possession at the time of the request. Since the UPHRC order was addressed to and received by the SP’s office, all records generated as a result (receipt, notings, ATRs) are indisputably “held by or under the control of” the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, a Public Authority.

3. Judicial Precedent: The Purpose of the RTI Act

The Supreme Court of India and various High Courts have consistently ruled that the RTI Act must be interpreted in a way that promotes the purpose of transparency and accountability (the object of the Act) and that the only grounds for denial are the specific exemptions listed in Section 8 and Section 9.

• In the landmark judgment of CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011), the Supreme Court clarified that the RTI Act provides access to all information that is available and existing with the public authority. It specifically noted that a public authority is not required to create information, interpret information, or furnish replies to hypothetical questions—but if the information exists as a record, it must be provided, subject only to the exemptions.

By denying the information on the ground that it is “not archival,” the PIO:

1. Introduced an extra-statutory hurdle not found anywhere in the RTI Act.
2. Failed to invoke a valid exemption under Section 8 (like national security, privacy, or ongoing investigation), which is the only legitimate way to deny existing information.

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🎯 Conclusion for the Second Appeal

Smt. Tiwari’s argument is legally sound. The PIO’s denial is based on a fundamental misreading of the statute. The requested documents (notings, ATR, logbook entries) are records and documents that are “held by” the public authority, and are therefore information under Section 2(f).

The State Information Commission should, therefore, issue a directive:

1. To the Public Authority to immediately furnish the requested information (or a valid Section 8 exemption).
2. To impose a penalty on the PIO under Section 20(1) for the unreasonable delay and the malafide/arbitrary denial of information.

That is an excellent next step. Based on the legal framework and judicial precedents, here is a summary of the strong arguments available to counter the PIO’s claim that the information is “not archival,” coupled with the legal grounds for imposing penalties.

The Information Commission will review this case on two main pillars: the Substantive Denial and the Procedural Default.

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🏛️ Legal Arguments Against PIO’s Denial of ‘Archival’ Information

The PIO’s reason for denial—that the information is “not archival”—is legally unsound and directly contradicts the definitions in the RTI Act, 2005. The following points should be argued before the Commission:

1. The Comprehensive Definition of ‘Information’ (Section 2(f))

• Argument: The RTI Act’s definition of “information” is inclusive and not restrictive. It explicitly covers “records, documents, memos, orders, reports, papers, [and] files” (Section 2(f)).
• Application: The appellant sought Notings, the Action Taken Report (ATR), and inward/receipt records concerning the UPHRC order. These are all documents and records that were created and are currently held by the SP’s office.
• Conclusion: The Act makes no distinction between ‘archival’ (old) records and ‘current’ (live) records. Any document that exists and is held by the public authority is legally “information.”

2. The Only Grounds for Denial are in Section 8 & 9

• Argument: As held by the Supreme Court in cases like CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, the RTI Act operates on the principle that disclosure is the rule, and exemption is the exception. A public authority can only reject a request by citing one of the specific exemptions listed in Section 8 (e.g., national security, personal privacy, ongoing investigation) or Section 9.
• Application: The PIO did not cite a valid Section 8 or 9 exemption. Instead, the PIO introduced a non-statutory, arbitrary, and legally invalid ground (‘not archival’) to deny access.
• Conclusion: The denial is arbitrary and illegal, reflecting a failure to correctly apply the law.

3. Information Must Be ‘Held By’ the Authority (Section 2(j))

• Argument: The definition of the “right to information” (Section 2(j)) is based on whether the information is “held by or under the control of any public authority.”
• Application: Since the UPHRC order was addressed to the SP Mirzapur, and the records of its receipt and processing are physically available in that office, the documents are unequivocally “held by” the public authority. A denial based on the information not being ‘archival’ is a baseless claim that the records somehow do not exist, which the appellant contests.

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🛑 Grounds for Penalty Against the PIO (Section 20)

The appeal should strongly press for the maximum penalty against the PIO based on the clear procedural and substantive defaults:

Legal Provision	Default Committed in the Appeal	Penalty Justification
Delay in Furnishing (Section 20(1) & Section 7(1))	The RTI application was disposed of after 4 months and 10 days, instead of the mandated 30 days.	This is a clear case of “not furnished information within the time” without any reasonable cause. A penalty of ₹250 per day for the period of delay is warranted.
Malafide Denial (Section 20(1))	The PIO “malafidely denied the request for information” by introducing the non-statutory “not archival” ground, which is designed to obstruct the flow of information.	This constitutes an arbitrary denial on a “flimsy ground,” which courts treat seriously as it defeats the purpose of the Act. The PIO bears the burden of proving they acted reasonably and diligently.
False/Misleading Information (Section 20(1))	The PIO effectively gave “incorrect or misleading information” by stating the document was not accessible under the law, when in fact, the law fully supports its disclosure.	The PIO provided an incorrect legal basis for rejection, which is a penal offense.

Maximum Penalty: The Commission can impose a penalty of ₹250 per day for the delay, up to a maximum of ₹25,000, to be recovered from the PIO’s salary. Given the gross delay and the arbitrary denial ground, the maximum penalty is justifiable.

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This framework uses the precise language of the Act and established judicial principles to dismantle the PIO’s defense and argue for both the release of information and accountability through penalty.