Introduction Victimisation of Justice Seekers in India

Explore the victimisation of justice seekers in India and how automated systems can target innocent citizens. In recent years, the landscape of justice has become increasingly complex; consequently, individuals striving to seek redress and accountability often face significant obstacles. While automated systems are designed to enhance efficiency and streamline processes, they have inadvertently perpetuated injustices. Specifically, these systems can misidentify individuals based on biased algorithms or insufficient data, which ultimately leads to wrongful accusations and undue scrutiny of innocent citizens. As a result, the very technology intended to uphold justice can transform into a tool of oppression, further exacerbating the plight of those who desperately seek justice in a system that frequently overlooks their rights and concerns. Therefore, the intersection of technology and justice demands a critical examination to protect vulnerable populations from further victimisation.

Victimisation of Justice Seekers in India: How Digital Governance and Bank Fraud Target the Innocent

In modern public governance, automated platforms promise speed and neutrality. However, behind this digital front lies a deeply troubling reality. Specifically, we see the pervasive victimisation of justice seekers in India. Furthermore, when state agencies and banks rely on automated alerts without human verification, they inevitably target innocent citizens. Consequently, an aggrieved citizen exposing illegal acts quickly transforms from a victim into a target.

For instance, the ongoing struggle of Mahesh Pratap Singh, an anti-corruption defender from Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh, clearly illustrates this crisis. Indeed, his experience reveals major systemic failures across public sector banks, cybercrime cells, and tax departments. Moreover, it demonstrates how bank negligence can ultimately trigger multi-agency actions that paralyze a citizen’s fundamental right to life, illustrating the widespread victimisation of justice seekers in India.

Rogue Banking and Identity Fabrication: Victimisation of Justice Seekers in India

To begin with, the groundwork for this harassment did not start on the dark web. Instead, it began inside a prominent public sector lender: State Bank of India, Gangoli Branch (Branch Code: 50534), located in Jind District, Haryana.

Specifically, without the knowledge, presence, or approval of the victim—who has never lived in or visited Jind—bank staff improperly entered his Permanent Account Number (PAN: GSWPS0850Q) into two external accounts:

• Savings Bank Account No. 40191917870
• Kisan Credit Card (KCC) Loan Account No. 40191978538

In fact, linking a genuine PAN to third-party accounts without checking ID proofs breaks Reserve Bank of India rules and Anti-Money Laundering mandates. Consequently, when challenged, the bank could not deny the error. In response, in an official reply dated 20 September 2022 under PMO registration PMOPG/E/2022/0224835, the branch admitted that staff had “wrongly fed” the PAN and started an inquiry.

Furthermore, on 03 November 2024, the Branch Manager of SBI Gangoli formally confirmed under CPGRAMS registration GOVHY/E/2023/0008452:

“We apologize for the inconvenience caused due to incorrect PAN Number linkage. In this matter we would like to state that the PAN Number was immediately removed from accounts 40191917870 and 40191978538. Moreover as per enquiry already concluded, appropriate action was initiated against the erring officials as per bank’s instruction and procedures.”

However, this internal admission led directly to a bureaucratic cover-up. Subsequently, when the complainant asked for the names, titles, and punishment records of the guilty staff, the bank refused to share details under Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act. Therefore, this deliberate cover-up clearly shows the institutional victimisation of justice seekers in India, effectively shielding rogue employees while leaving the fake digital record active across tax and bank databases.

Corporate Volumes on Modest Ledgers: Multi-Crore Exploitation

Once a citizen’s financial ID is compromised within central banking networks, fraudsters exploit the breach across the country. Consequently, the fake trail created at Gangoli branch quickly caused severe problems.

Firstly, the victim registered First Information Report (FIR) No. 291/2023 at Police Station Kotwali Katra, Mirzapur, under Section 420 IPC and Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act. Accordingly, this action legally established him as an aggrieved party. Soon after, official reports revealed the massive scale of the racket:

• Income Tax Department Findings: Obviously Case Diary Entry No. 60 (dated 22 August 2026) notably confirmed that the Directorate of Income Tax (Intelligence & Criminal Investigation) identified 70 separate entities fraudulently using the victim’s compromised PAN to claim bogus House Rent Allowance (HRA) deductions.
• Commercial and GST Fabrication: Compliance monitoring under e-Campaign DIN INSIGHT/CMP/01/2022-23/10230022276330001 generated notices flagging Rs. 1.49 Crores in business receipts, Rs. 5.99 Crores in GST purchases, and Rs. 8.63 Crores in GST turnover.
• Fictitious Rental Demands: Another notice (DIN INSIGHT/CMP/02/2021-22/11210066119870001) cited fabricated rental income of Rs. 1,19,34,974/- for FY 2020–21.

In total, fraudulent groups operated at least 13 fake bank accounts using this compromised identity, running transactions over Rs. 54 Crores. However, instead of protecting the complainant, tax and investigative bodies sent a flood of notices. As a result, an older person had to spend years proving that their modest income had no connection to these huge amounts.

Selective Inaction: Paper Teams and Law Enforcement Delays

Despite clear written evidence, police showed little interest in prosecuting the real culprits. Indeed, while tax portals automatically flagged the compromised PAN, the police inquiry stalled indefinitely.

Consequently, on 06 July 2026, the Uttar Pradesh State Information Commission intervened to address the extensive investigative delays. In response, the Superintendent of Police, Mirzapur, constituted a specialized six-member team under executive order Reader/SP-35/2026.

However, official Case Diary entries (Parcha Nos. 58 to 62) evidently indicated that this team existed only on paper; in practice, the assigned team leader and members conducted no joint raids, failed to track any financial groups, and did not carry out any field operations.

Even worse, the investigating officer showed clear bias. Specifically, out of the 70 fraudsters found by tax officers, the police sent notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to only 20 people on 03 September 2026, and, furthermore, to just 3 people on 22 September 2026. As a result, 47 identified offenders received no notices at all. Consequently, this slow response demonstrates how the victimisation of justice seekers in India grows when police treat digital identity theft as merely a simple clerical error.

The Culmination: Arbitrary Account Freeze and Financial Paralysis

Meanwhile, as the 70 perpetrators remained untouched, automated cyber enforcement struck the innocent victim right before a scheduled hearing.

On 29 September 2026 at 16:40 IST, State Bank of India placed a sudden debit freeze on the complainant’s primary domestic account:

• Account Affected: Savings Bank Account No. 34645721675, SBI City Branch Mirzapur (Branch Code: 00130)
• Lien Amount: Rs. 1,16,28,163.00
• System Reference: caseid683526

Triggered automatically through the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (NCRP) / CFCFRMS system, the bank consequently placed a freeze over Rs. 1.16 Crore on a basic personal account. Nevertheless, annual deposits in this account never exceed Rs. 1,00,000/-. Moreover, bank records confirm that none of the disputed money ever entered this account.

In fact, the algorithm executed the freeze without any human review, instantly dropping the available balance of Rs. 3,891.97 to Rs. 0.00. In addition, the bank issued no notice, gave no chance for explanation, and ignored basic fairness.

Consequently, this arbitrary action directly threatened human life. Indeed, the freeze left the household without funds for daily food and urgent medical care for family members living with chronic illnesses. Ultimately, when state systems starve a citizen’s family to enforce an unverified hold, administrative failure creates severe constitutional violations under Article 21.

Multi-Front Counter-Measures Against Administrative Tyranny

To remove this illegal hold, the complainant started urgent legal actions across multiple national oversight offices:

• RTI Life and Liberty Petition (30 September 2026): Invoked the 48-hour emergency proviso under Section 7(1) of the RTI Act before the CPIO supervising SBI City Branch Mirzapur, demanding production of the requisition order behind caseid683526 and ledger proof confirming nil receipts.
• Banking Division Oversight: Lodged CPGRAMS registration DEABD/E/2026/0169634 with the Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, challenging the mechanical enforcement of cyber liens on domestic victim accounts.
• SBI Corporate Centre Vigilance Escalation: Filed PMO petition PMOPG/E/2026/0188344, assigned directly to the Chief General Manager (CGM & CXO), SBI Corporate Centre, Mumbai, demanding unfreezing and vigilance prosecution against the delinquent officials of Gangoli Branch.
• Ministry of Home Affairs & I4C Action: Registered PMO petition PMOPG/E/2026/0188351, assigned to Shri Rajesh Kumar, CEO of the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), demanding an administrative override of the NCRP hold and prosecution of the banking syndicate under FIR 291/2023.
• State Information Commission Pleadings: Placed the arbitrary account freeze on record before Court S-1 of the UP State Information Commission, demanding an immediate police clearance certificate.

In conclusion, the systemic victimisation of justice seekers in India will continue to grow until automated enforcement tools undergo strict human review and legal oversight. When algorithms punish the complainant while agencies protect negligent staff, justice fails. Therefore, true accountability requires fast prosecution of internal bank fraud, immediate unfreezing of victim accounts, and an end to automated harassment.

Here is the complete information presented in a clean, prose-and-bullet structure without any Markdown tables. This layout avoids the common Yoast SEO issues related to short cell fragments, low transition word density, and passive voice.

Key Public Authority Portals, Application References, and Contact Particulars

1. Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C): Addressing Victimisation of Justice Seekers in India

• Application Reference: Registration Number PMOPG/E/2026/0188351
• Designated Authority: Shri Rajesh Kumar, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
• Official Address: 5th Floor, NDCC-II Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi – 110001
• Email Contact: ceo-i4c@mha.gov.in
• Telephone: 011-23438207
• Official Portal: Central Grievance Portal (CPGRAMS)
• 
  

2. State Bank of India Corporate Centre, Customer Service Department

• Application Reference: Registration Number PMOPG/E/2026/0188344
• Designated Authority: Chief General Manager (CGM & CXO)
• Official Address: State Bank Bhawan, 16th Floor, Madam Cama Road, Nariman Point, Mumbai – 400021
• Email Contact: gm.customer@sbi.co.in
• Telephone: 022-22740430
• Official Portal: Central Grievance Portal (CPGRAMS)
• 
  

3. Department of Financial Services (Banking Division), Ministry of Finance

• Application Reference: Registration Number DEABD/E/2026/0169634
• Designated Authority: Shri Swapnil Agrawal, Director (Banking Division)
• Official Address: 3rd Floor, Jeevan Deep Building, Sansad Marg, New Delhi – 110001
• Email Contact: dir.sa-dfs@gov.in
• Telephone: 011-23346785
• Direct Tracking Link: CPGRAMS Registration Detail Page
• 
  

4. State Information Commission, Uttar Pradesh

• Appeal References: Appeal Number S-01/A/0061/2024, Registration Number A-20240100130, Diary Number D-290920260003
• Designated Authority: Court S-1, Presided over by Dr Raj Kumar Vishwakarma
• Hearing Email: hearingcourts1.upic@up.gov.in
• Official Website: Uttar Pradesh Information Commission Portal

5. Cyber Crime Police Station and District Police Executive, Mirzapur in Victimisation of Justice Seekers in India

• Case Reference: First Information Report / Case Crime Number 291/2023, Kotwali Katra
• Designated Officers: Superintendent of Police, Additional SP (Operations & Cyber), and Station House Officer (Cyber Crime PS)
• Official Emails: spmzr-up@nic.in, asp-op.mi@up.gov.in, ps-cybercrime.mi@up.gov.in, and jansuchanacellmzr@gmail.com
• Official Website: Uttar Pradesh Police Portal

6. State Bank of India, Gangoli Branch, District Jind, Haryana

• Grievance References: CPGRAMS GOVHY/E/2023/0008452 and PMO Grievance PMOPG/E/2022/0224835
• Designated Officer: Branch Manager, Gangoli Branch (Branch Code: 50534, IFSC: SBIN0050534)
• Email Contact: sbi.50534@sbi.co.in
• Telephone: 01686-246114
• Official Website: State Bank of India Corporate Website

7. State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Chandigarh

• RTI Appeal References: First Appeal Number 69, Online Appeal Registration SBICH/A/E/22/00164, RTI Application SBICH/R/E/22/00503
• Designated Authority: First Appellate Authority & General Manager (Network-2), Local Head Office, Sector 17-A, Chandigarh
• Official Website: State Bank of India Corporate Website

8. Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Chandigarh Zone in Victimisation of Justice Seekers in India

• Appeal and Order References: RTI Appeal CBIMH/A/E/23/00024, Appellate Order 53/RTI Act/2005/ZO/CHG/2022, ACB Dispatch Letter 3809/RTI/24/2022/ACB/CBI/CHG
• Designated Authorities: Joint Director & Head of Zone (Appellate Authority), and DIG / Head of Branch-cum-CPIO, Anti-Corruption Branch, Sector 30-A, Chandigarh
• Official Email: hozchg@cbi.gov.in
• Official Website: Central Bureau of Investigation Portal

9. Income Tax Department (Faceless Assessment & Compliance Insight Desk)

• e-Campaign References: DIN INSIGHT/CMP/01/2022-23/10230022276330001 and DIN INSIGHT/CMP/02/2021-22/11210066119870001
• Designated Cell: Directorate of Income Tax (Intelligence & Criminal Investigation)
• Compliance Portal: Income Tax Insight Portal

10. Office of the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA), Jabalpur

• Grievance Reference: File Number GC/3502/Complain/M.O./2022-23 (Docket Ref: A/III/2528/CMP DMS/2022-23)
• Designated Officer: Senior Accounts Officer (SAO), Grievance Cell, Ridge Road, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh
• Official Email: cdajbpom.dad@nic.in
• Telephone: 0761-2608012 and 0761-2608013 (Fax: 0761-2605622)
• Official Website: Controller General of Defence Accounts Portal

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